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INTRODUCTION
In a 1959 lecture, the late physicist Richard Feynman famously observed that, in
principle, nothing prevents “the possibility of [humans] maneuvering things atom by
atom.”1 Today, the scientific field that Feynman foresaw—nanotechnology—not only
exists, but receives over one billion dollars in federal funding per year for research in
fields as varied as mechanical and electrical engineering, biology, medicine, information
technology, optics, and cognitive science.2 Speculation by popular commentators about
what this research ultimately will mean for humanity ranges from a utopian vision of
boundless energy and zero pollution to a “gray goo” nightmare of self-replicating
nanodevices that cause incomprehensibly vast material destruction.3
∗
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1
Richard P. Feynman, There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom, ENG. & SCI. (1960).
2
The 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, passed in 2003, allocates
nearly $3.7 billion to nanotechnology research from 2005 to 2008, not including substantial expenditures
on defense related nanoscale research.
3
Compare Lynn. L. Bergeson & Bethami Auerbach, 21 ENVTL. FORUM 30, 32 (March/April
2004) (calling nanotechnology “perhaps the ultimate sustainable development tool”) and Gary Stix, Little
Big Science, SCI. AMERICAN 32, 37, Sept. 16, 2001 (“If the nano concept holds together, it could, in fact lay
the groundwork for a new industrial revolution.”), with Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, WIRED,

Even among expert observers, opinions of nanotechnology vary widely in their
tone and content. A committee convened by the U.S. National Research Council, for
instance, breathlessly predicted that “[w]ith potential applications in virtually every
existing industry and new applications yet to be discovered, nanoscale science and
technology will no doubt emerge as one of the major drivers of economic growth in the
first part of the new millennium.”4 In contrast, given the dearth of knowledge presently
available regarding human health and environmental consequences of nanomaterials, a
report issued in Britain by The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering
recommended “as a precautionary measure that factories and research laboratories treat
manufactured nanoparticles and nanotubes as if they were hazardous.”5
Although it would be easy to overstate the distinction between U.S. and European
approaches to risk regulation,6 it is nevertheless striking how the reports of these
respective national agencies appear to reinforce the common perception that U.S. experts
and policymakers today favor less conservative environmental, health, and safety
measures than their European counterparts. The British scientific societies, for instance,
called for a national prohibition on “the use of free nanoparticles in environmental
applications such as remediation of groundwater,”7 pending development of better
scientific information and understanding regarding the potential consequences of such
releases. Researchers in the United States, on the other hand, already are engaging in
August 4, 2000, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html (“Our most powerful
21st-century technologies - robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotech - are threatening to make humans
an endangered species.”). See also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Environmental Regulation of Nanotechnology,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. __ (2001) (noting that predictions of the environmental implications of nanotechnology
range from “the most radical of the green visions” to the “worry that rogue nanodevices will devour the
planet”).
4
COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, DIVISION ON
ENGINEERING AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SMALL WONDERS, ENDLESS
FRONTIERS: A REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE 2 (2002).
5
See, e.g., THE ROYAL SOCIETY AND THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, NANOSCIENCE AND
NANOTECHNOLOGIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES x (July, 2004).
6
As Jonathan Wiener has noted, the common perception that the United States tends to favor more
permissive policies than the European Union overlooks important exceptions and nuances—witness, for
instance, the stronger European embrace of nuclear power or the greater U.S. willingness to deter public
smoking. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All ? A Comment on the Comparison and
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 207 (2003). See also Jonathan B.
Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe, 5 J. RISK RES. 317
(2002). Such ready counterexamples notwithstanding, there remains an important sense in which U.S. and
European policymakers believe themselves to be engaged in a debate over appropriate regulatory
approaches going forward. See, e.g., ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (2002) (describing U.S.-led opposition to inclusion of the PP in the
international convention on persistent organic pollutants on the basis that the principle was “unscientific”);
id. at 138 (describing U.S. opposition to reliance on the PP within a report on risk analysis principles and
guidelines at the Codex Alimentarius Commission). Explicating the theoretical and practical differences of
these approaches therefore remains a significant exercise, regardless of how closely U.S. and European
regulations and attitudes in the past conform to the common stereotype.
7
THE ROYAL SOCIETY AND THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, supra note __, at x.

2

field releases of nanoparticles in hopes of uncovering substances capable of remediating
pollution.8 Similarly, a European Union scientific committee carefully scrutinized the
health risks of sunscreen products that contain free nanoparticles, ultimately refusing to
approve microfine zinc oxide for use as a UV filter in light of suggestive evidence that
the substance might pass through the skin and damage DNA.9 During the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA)’s review of nanoparticle-containing sunscreens, on the other
hand, the agency confidently opined that chemical substances shown to be safe at the
macroscale also can be assumed, without further investigation, to be safe at the
nanoscale.10
This apparent difference in regulatory attitude between the United States and
Europe often is said to emerge from the jurisdictions’ contrasting stances toward two
policymaking paradigms that compete for acceptance within environmental, health, and
safety regulation: One—known as cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and increasingly
associated with the United States11—strives to enhance social welfare by predicting,
weighting, and aggregating all relevant consequences of policy proposals in order to
identify those choices that represent welfare-maximizing uses of public resources; the
other—associated with the precautionary principle (PP) and the European approach to
risk regulation12—eschews optimization in favour of more pragmatic forms of
decisionmaking. One oft-cited articulation of the PP, for instance, seeks to trigger an
incremental process of risk regulation through the simple admonition, “When an activity

8

See W. Zhang, Nanoscale Iron Particles for Environmental Remediation: An Overview, 5 J.
NANOPARTICLE RES. 323 (2003).
9
See SCCNFP, Opinion Concerning Zinc Oxide (Colipa nS76). SCCNFP/0690/03, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_risk/committees/sccp/documents/out242_en.pdf.
10
See FDA, 64 Fed. Reg. 27666, 27671 (1999).
11
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE ix (2002) (“Gradually, and in fits and starts,
American government is becoming a cost-benefit state.”) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT
STATE].
12
See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C 191, 29 July 1992, at art. 130r (stating
that EC environmental policy “shall be based on the precautionary principle”); Commission of the
European Community, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, February 2,
2000, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf. See also
Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary Principle as a Basis for Decisionmaking, The
Economist’s Voice, Vol. 2, No. 2, Article 8 (2005) (noting that “[t]he European Union has taken a
leadership role in promoting the precautionary principle as a basis for making decisions on environmental
policy and other areas”); Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and
Cross-Cultural Risk Perceptions, Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 220 at 1-2
(2d Series, August 2004) (observing that “[i]t has become standard to say that with respect to risks, Europe
and the United States can be distinguished along a single axis: Europe accepts the Precautionary Principle
and the United States does not”) [hereinafter, Precautions Against What?]; Gail Charnley & E. Donald
Elliott, Democratization of Risk Analysis, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 1399, 1401 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002) (“When Europeans call for decision based on ‘the
precautionary principle’ in international forums, they are challenging the core premise of the American
legal culture.”).
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raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures
should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established.”13
Despite the efforts of numerous scholars to forge a middle path between these
extremes of “comprehensive rationality and incrementalism,”14 today the debate over
CBA and the PP in the environmental, health, and safety context remains as polarized as
ever. On the one hand, several influential commentators—including Matthew Adler and
Eric Posner,15 Kenneth Arrow,16 Justice Stephen Breyer,17 Judge Richard Posner,18 Cass
Sunstein,19 and others20—have come to the conclusion that the normative case in favor of
13

Peter Montague, The Precautionary Principle, RACHEL’S ENV’T & HEALTH WKLY., Feb. 19,
1998, at 1, available at http://www.monitor.net/rachel/r586.html (describing and quoting the 1998
Wingspread Declaration). See also 1991 Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, art. 3(f) (requiring
implementation of “the precautionary principle to pollution prevention through the application of clean
production methods, rather than the pursuit of a permissible emissions approach based on assimilative
capacity assumptions.”). Other formulations of the PP do not contain an affirmative requirement to
undertake precautionary measures. Instead, they simply state that scientific uncertainty by itself should not
be taken to weigh against the adoption of precautionary measures. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, preamble, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992)
(declaring that “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a
threat”). It is sometimes argued that this interpretation of the PP is “trivially true.” Proponents of this
version of the principle, however, offer their seemingly trivial reminder in response to “the self-interested
claims of private groups demanding unambiguous evidence of harm” before environmental, health, and
safety regulations are imposed. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1003 (2003). Such claims have proven surprisingly successful in many policy debates (including especially
the U.S. climate change debate), despite the fact that “no rational society requires” full certainty before
acting. Id.
14
Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 395
(1981). For examples of scholarship aiming to bridge the divide between the PP and CBA, see DANIEL A.
FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
(1999); Symposium Issue, The Pragmatic Ecologist: Environmental Protection as a Jurisdynamic
Experience, 87 MINN. L. REV. 847 (2003); J. B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New
(Pragmatist) Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 524 (2000); J. B. Ruhl, A
Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 385-86 (2002).
15
See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165
(1999).
16
See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental, Health,
and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221 (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the
Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 366-67 (1970).
17
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
(1993).
18
RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004) [hereinafter, POSNER,
CATASTROPHE]; Richard Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification and Comment on
Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153 (2000).
19
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR]; SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note __; Sunstein, Beyond
the Precautionary Principle, supra note __; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON]; Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default
Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000).
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CBA is simply overwhelming and that competing paradigms such as the PP are either
incoherent or inappropriate as frameworks for risk regulation. The conclusion of these
thinkers is particularly notable in light of their acknowledgment that CBA suffers from a
number of conceptual and practical limitations of its own. Nevertheless, CBA’s
proponents increasingly believe that the “first generation debate” about the procedure’s
normative desirability is over and that today the important questions concern “second
generation” issues of how best to implement CBA in the environmental, health, and
safety regulation context.21 The basic superiority of CBA as a policy tool for risk
regulation, in other words, is no longer seriously doubted.
Except, of course, that it is, and not just by the “environmental Darth Vader[s]” of
the world,22 but by serious, thoughtful observers of the administrative state.23 For
instance, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling maintain that regulatory CBA as
commonly practiced is flawed for at least four critical reasons: “[T]he standard economic
approaches to valuation are inaccurate and implausible; the use of discounting [to
compare intertemporal costs and benefits] improperly trivializes future harms and the
irreversibility of some environmental problems; the reliance [of CBA] on aggregate,
monetized benefits excludes questions of fairness and morality; and the value-laden and
complex cost-benefit process is neither objective nor transparent.”24 Moreover, the
response of some CBA proponents to call for a “modest, nonsectarian”25 brand of cost20

See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis With the Principle That Safety
Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 (2001); Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis
So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1423 (1996).
21
SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note __, at xi. See also SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON,
supra note __, at 5-6 (asserting that “‘first-generation’ debate about whether to base regulatory choices on
cost-benefit analysis at all . . . is now ending, with a substantial victory for the proponents of cost-benefit
analysis”); Hahn & Sunstein, supra note __, at 6 (“We do not believe there is any principled way of making
policy decisions without making the best possible effort to balance all the relevant costs of a policy against
the benefits.”).
22
Alex Kozinski, Gore Wars, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1742, 1767 (2002) (reviewing BJØRN LOMBORG,
THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001)).
23
See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) [hereinafter ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, RICELESS];
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH (2003); Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi, 64
MARYLAND L. REV. 159 (2005); Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 281 (2004) [hereinafter, McGarity, MTBE]; Thomas O. McGarity, The Goals of Environmental
Legislation, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 529 (2004) [hereinafter McGarity, Goals]; Gregory C.
Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653 (2003); Amy
Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUMBIA J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004);
Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Costs of Health, Safety, and Environmental
Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997 (2002); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7
(1998); David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative CostBenefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545 (1997).
24
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1563 (2002).
25
Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, Chicago-John M. Olin Law & Economics Working
Paper No. 150 at 7 (2002).

5

benefit calculation in light of these arguable shortcomings does not satisfy thinkers such
as Ackerman and Heinzerling. In their view, CBA’s flaws render the procedure
irredeemable as a device for setting standards of environmental, health, and safety
protection.26 Accordingly, they applaud the fact the precautionary approach continues to
enjoy more prominence and support than CBA outside of U.S. academic and policy
circles27—a fact that critics instead want to attribute to such failings as poor
information,28 cognitive error,29 and public hysteria.30
This Article, which is part of a larger project on the competing merits of CBA and
the PP,31 examines one specific plank of the case against the PP: the claim that the
principle’s ignorance of the opportunity costs of precaution leads to indeterminate or
impoverishing policy advice. Because PP defenders emphasize the limits of human
knowledge and the frequency of unpleasant surprises from technology and industrial
development, they prefer an ex ante stance of precaution whenever a proposed activity
meets some threshold possibility of causing severe harm to human health or the
environment.32 Importantly, they prefer this stance even in the face of potential
26

See PRICELESS, supra note __, at 219-220 (arguing that “the most fundamental problem is not in
the details of any particular cost-benefit analysis, but rather in the framing decision about which policies
are and which are not subject to such analyses”).
27
In addition to its expression in European Union law and in the domestic laws and regulations of
many nations outside of the E.U., see supra note 12, the PP also has appeared in a number of multilateral
documents and is even considered by some observers to be a strong candidate for inclusion within
customary international law. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22) 412 (Palmer, J.,
dissenting) (observing that “the norm involved in the precautionary principle has developed rapidly and
may now be a principle of customary international law relating to the environment.”); GabcikovoNagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) 342 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (noting
that the PP is “gaining increasing support as part of the international law of the environment”). See also D.
Freestone & E. Hey, Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (D. Freestone & E. Hey eds., 1996), p. 94 (“[T]he precautionary
concept has been included in virtually every recent treaty and policy document related to the protection and
preservation of the environment.”); D. Freestone & Z. Makuch, The New International Environmental Law
of Fisheries: The 1995 UN Straddling Stocks Convention, in 7 YIEL 3, 11 (1996) (referring to the PP as a
“concept, which in less than a decade has assumed primary importance in international environmental
forums”); F. ORREGA VICUÑA, THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES (1999), p.
156 (“The precautionary principle . . . has taken a central place in the discussion of most international
regimes for environmental protection.”).
28

See AARON WILDAVSKY,
AND SAFETY ISSUES 1-2 (1995).

BUT

IS IT

TRUE?: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE

TO

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH

29

See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note __, at 28-52.
See Tumur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683 (1999) (positing that rational risk regulation is confounded by the political pressure exerted by
“populist firestorms”).
31
See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, ECOLOGIC: COMPLEXITY, COGNITION, AND OUR ENVIRONMENTAL
FUTURE (unpublished manuscript).
30

32

The statement in the text captures the essential structure of the PP. See, e.g., TROUWBORST,
supra note __, at 52 (“[I]n the presence of a threat of (non-negligible) environmental harm accompanied by
scientific uncertainty, regulatory action should nevertheless be taken to prevent or remedy the hazard
concerned.”). Important implementation issues then include: (1) the degree of credibility or seriousness of
threat required in order to trigger the precautionary obligation; (2) the precise form that regulatory response
should take; (3) and the manner in which the regulatory response should be revisited and revised over time.

6

benefits—such as those promised by the use of nanoparticles in groundwater remediation
or skin protection—that may themselves be ameliorative of environmental, health, and
safety dangers. Although their reasoning has never been perfectly clear,33 advocates of
the PP regard such foregone benefits as conceptually distinct from, and somehow less
central than, the more affirmative consequences that may result from allowing potentially
harmful activities to proceed.
Naturally, this asymmetric aspect of the PP generates strident criticism,
particularly from consequentialist-utilitarian thinkers such as those who advocate CBA.
Along with substitute risks, lulling effects, and other purportedly overlooked health
consequences of precautionary regulation,34 these critics argue that the PP’s failure to
treat opportunity costs pari passu with the primary risks targeted by policy measures is
simply indefensible. Moreover, they argue that if opportunity costs of regulation were
taken into account in the design of the PP, then “the real problem with the principle
[would become] that it offers no guidance—not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all
courses of action, including regulation.”35 To the PP’s detractors, therefore, the principle
33

The classic defense of the PP contends that the benefits of regulatory precaution consist of saved
human lives or averted ecological harms, while the costs typically consist of lost economic profits or some
other opportunity cost that is not viewed as fully commensurable with human or environmental harm. See
Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 22 (1978);
Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer’s Critique of
Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 732 (1995); Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with
the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 118 n.14 (2001); Kristin
Shrader-Frechette, Methodological Rules for Four Classes of Scientific Uncertainty, in SCIENTIFIC
UNCERTAINTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING 12, 15 (1995). As noted infra text accompanying
notes50-58, this incommensurability defense is partially (but only partially) undermined by the frequent
appearance of human lives or ecological assets on both sides of the regulatory ledger.
34

For an influential analytical overview and collection of case studies involving such “risk-risk”
tradeoffs, see JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK (1995).
35
Sunstein, Precautions Against What?, supra note __, at 7. See also SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR,
supra note __, at 42 (observing that precautionary risk regulation tends to lack “concern [for] the benefits
that are foregone as a result of precaution); Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, supra
note __, at 18 (arguing that “[w]hen the principle seems to be giving guidance, it is often because those
who use it are focusing on one aspect of risk-related situations and neglecting others”); Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=691447, at 5 (“No one believes that for moral reasons, social
planners should refuse to take account of [risk-risk] tradeoffs.”); John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate
Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA.
J. INT’L L. 229, 273 (2003) (arguing that “the precautionary principle often remains coherent only by
focusing on the risks of action at the expense of those of inaction”); Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a
Multi-Risk World, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509 (Dennis
D. Paustenbach ed., 2002); M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT (2001); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10790 (2001); Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary
Principle and the Proposed International Safety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173, 195 (2000) (“The
problem is that by focusing on one set of risks—those posed by the introduction of new technologies with
somewhat uncertain effects—the precautionary principle turns a blind eye to the harms that occur, or are
made worse, due to the lack of technological development.”); Howard Margolis, A New Account of
Expert/Lay Conflicts of Risk Intuition, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 115 (1997); Frank B. Cross,
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996); HOWARD
MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
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either must be expanded to include an obligation to consider the opportunity costs of
regulatory activity—in which case it would become woefully indeterminate—or the
principle must be rejected as a one-sided tool likely to prolong a range of harms that
would be alleviated in its absence.
Despite the seemingly unimpeachable logic of this critique, the role of
opportunity costs in environmental, health, and safety regulation actually turns out to be
much more complicated and interesting than the CBA proponents’ account reveals.
Undoubtedly, CBA proponents are correct to note that no society should flatly ignore the
opportunity costs of precautionary regulation. But this is a trivial observation, for no
serious proponent of the PP disagrees with it. Despite frequent caricature of the PP as a
crudely asymmetric heuristic,36 PP proponents actually regard the principle as merely one
aspect of a much more elaborate regulatory process in which the PP is applied with a
view toward proportionality of response37 and adaptability over time.38 Just as no
physician would unthinkingly and universally follow the precautionary mandate of the
Hippocratic adage—“first, do no harm”—no regulator would adhere to the PP without
paying some attention to foregone benefits, new information, and changed
circumstances.39 Thus, the proper contrast between CBA and the PP is not one of
comprehensive and partial modes of analysis, as critics of the PP assert,40 but rather of
static and dynamic, optimizing and incremental, formalized and pragmatic
decisionmaking models.
As Parts I and II of this Article demonstrate, there are underappreciated benefits
to the PP’s more modest approach. Specifically, unlike the optimization framework of
CBA, which proceeds awkwardly in the absence of fully characterized risks and
consensus normative agreement on exogenized choice criteria, the PP’s approach reflects
great sensitivity to the fact that decisionmaking in the face of many environmental
problems demands not only substantive, but also procedural and discursive rationality.
This is particularly the case with regard to the kinds of multidimensional, long-term

ISSUES 2 (1996) (“Good judgment—judgment that will look reasonable when the passions of the moment
have passed—has to deal with what I label the ‘fungibility’ (between opportunities and dangers) that
ordinarily confronts us.”).
36
See John S. Applegate, supra note __, at 29 (“Critics of the [PP] often misrepresent its
regulatory standard as unitary and draconian: to ban or forgo an activity or technology altogether. Neither
the texts of the [PP] nor the writings of its advocates bears this out.”).
37
See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the
precautionary principle, COM(2000) 1 (Feb. 2, 2000) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Communication from
the Commission], available at http:// europa/eu/int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf.
38
See Joanne Scott, The Precautionary Principle Before the European Courts, in PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 21 (Richard Macrory et al. eds., 2004) (observing that the PP is applied
in a conditional, preliminary fashion that not only allows decisionmakers to “exercise their judgment with
respect to risk,” but also helps to avoid the possibility that the PP “will threaten paralysis in the manner
feared by [critics of the principle]”).
39
See infra text accompanying notes 159-162 (describing various “safety valves” associated with
the precautionary approach that allow for relaxation of its dictates in appropriate circumstances).
40
See supra note 34.
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questions that are raised by the paradigm of sustainable development law,41 and that
reveal cost-benefit optimization to be both analytically and democratically unsatisfactory.
Thus, Parts I and II conclude that the most important task presently facing scholars of
environmental law is not, as CBA proponents would have it, to further refine the
technical details of the optimization paradigm in order to suit the sustainable
development challenge. Rather, the task is to reconcile environmental management’s
need for flexibility and dynamism with democracy’s need for meaningful public input.
The PP by itself does not resolve such challenges. However, significantly—and in
contrast to CBA—it does acknowledge their existence and importance.
Although the critique of CBA offered in Parts I and II is aggressive, the aim is not
to persuade readers of the force of any particular attack or even of the attacks in
combination. Rather, the aim is to unsettle the view that the “first generation debate” in
risk regulation has been unequivocally resolved in favor of CBA.42 Raising doubts in this
manner serves to lend urgency to the more fundamental argument that is offered in Part
III—the argument that CBA’s most worrisome aspect is not the results that it generates in
particular policy cases, but the threat that it poses over time to our ability to continue
coherently debating how we might better manage environmental risk and achieve
sustainable development. By its nature, CBA tends to suggest that government policies
are “hostage to what the facts turn out to show in particular domains,”43 such that no
distinctive notion of collective decisionmaking responsibility is deemed necessary or
appropriate. So conceived, the methodology is unable in the end to account for the
normativity of what the facts tell us—that is, for the assumption that some agent or
institution somewhere should act in accordance with the facts so discovered.44 In the long
41

See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEXAS L.
REV. 2109 (2005) [hereinafter Kysar, Sustainable Development]. The PP tends to be closely associated with
the sustainable development movement. See 1990 Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in
the ECE Region para. 7 (“In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the
precautionary principle.”); J.B. Ruhl, A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Sustainability; James Cameron,
The Precautionary Principle, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENIUM 239, 239-240 (Gary P.
Sampson and W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 2002) (“The precautionary principle is part of a system of rules
designed to guide human behavior towards the ideal of an environmentally sustainable economy.”); Tim
O’Riordan, Andrew Jordan, & James Cameron, The Evolution of the Precautionary Principle, in
REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 9, 13 (Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron, & Andrew
Jordan eds., 2001) (noting that the PP’s “future lies in the debate and policy setting of sustainability, rather
than environmentalism”); Michael C. Farmer & Alan Randall, The Rationality of a Safe Minimum
Standard, 74 LAND ECON. 287, 287 (1998) (noting that some “advocates of the precautionary principle
expand [safe minimum standard] protections into a comprehensive, strong sustainability objective”). Like
the PP, the sustainable development concept has been harshly criticized as indeterminate and potentially
counterproductive. See, e.g., WILFRED BECKERMAN, A POVERTY OF REASON: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2002). Nevertheless, also like the PP, it has remained prominent and influential,
particularly outside of the United States. See James Gustave Speth, International Environmental Law: Can
It Deal With the Big Issues?, 28 VT. L. REV. 779, 790 (2004).
42
See supra text accompanying note 21.
43
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note __, at 30.
44
Cf. SCHEFFLER, supra note __, at 158 (observing that utilitarians must offer a “plausible and
detailed account of utilitarian social and economic institutions and of the processes by which, in a society
regulated by utilitarian principles, motives would develop that were capable of generating ongoing support
for those institutions and principles”).
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run, such an approach not only may prove disruptive to the project of reasoning through
daunting moral issues such as international and intergenerational environmental
responsibility, but it also may undermine even its own attractiveness as a standard of
social choice.
Critics have attempted to dismiss the PP as “incoherent,”45 “indeterminate,”46
“paralyzing,”47 “worse than unhelpful,”48 and “literally senseless.”49 The most desirable
feature of the PP, however, is not necessarily the level of environmental, health, and
safety harm that it promises to avoid, but the more subtle manner in which the principle
reflects and reinforces the notion that political communities are distinct entities with
special responsibility to evaluate their decisions and the effects of their actions not only
on themselves, but also on other societies and other human generations. Despite its
seemingly unequivocal command, the Hippocratic principle—“first, do no harm”—is not
only or even primarily a behavioral prescription. It is instead a subtle, but steadfast
reminder to the professional so cautioned that her actions carry distinctive moral weight
and responsibility. It is a reminder most fundamentally to be moral. Similarly, the PP’s
requirement that we pause to consider the potentially catastrophic or irreversible
consequences of our action is at bottom a reminder that social choices express a
collective moral identity. Our identity. An identity that cannot be located within the
freestanding optimization logic of CBA, although we need to consider its content more
now than perhaps ever before.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY

Every decision to act or refrain from acting implies a range of alternatives that,
for better or worse, are not selected. For poets, it is these foregone options that constitute
the “saddest” category of human thought and experience: what “might have been.”50
Likewise, for critics of the PP, it is primarily these counterfactual costs of behaving
according to the principle’s dictates that render the device so objectionable as a basis for
public policymaking. The threat of genetically modified “super weeds”51 looms large, as
do the threats of catastrophic climate change52 and runaway nanodevices that transform
45

Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE
WES. L. REV. 315, 333 (2002).
46
Stone, supra note __, at 10799.
47
Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note __, at 1004.
48
Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, New Republic, March 11, 2004.
49
Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note __, at 1008.
50
See John Greenleaf Whittier, Maud Muller (“For of all sad words of tongue and pen, the saddest
are these, ‘It might have been.’”).
51
See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process-Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004) [hereinafter Kysar, Preferences for
Processes] (describing biological evidence of genetic trait dispersion among neighboring plants from
genetically modified crops).
52
See Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 BOSTON COLLEGE ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 555 (2004) [hereinafter Kysar, Climate Change]
(describing “abrupt climate change scenarios”).
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the planet into “gray goo.”53 Less visible, and therefore less attended to according to
proponents of the synoptic paradigm, are the vitamin enriched rice strains,54 the carbon
fueled economic gains,55 and the nanoscale cancer cures56 that might be foregone if
society were to abstain from pursuing novel technologies and other uncertain endeavors.
More dramatically, some commentators contend that the mere act of expending
money on regulatory compliance may create adverse health consequences, such that all of
regulation truly is a risk-risk proposition.57 There is no limit to this brand of radical
commensurability reasoning. For instance, although advocates of the risk-risk paradigm
have yet to extend their approach to environmental harms, a plausible basis exists for
doing so. Specifically, in light of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature—
which purports to find a causal relationship between growth in national GDP per capita
and environmental quality—analysts could argue that regulatory expenditures imply a
necessary decline in environmental quality, such that regulation not only seems to entail a
health-health tradeoff, but an environment-environment one as well.58
Given the apparent pervasiveness of benefits foregone in the context of protective
regulation—including especially benefits that would themselves take the form of
improvements to human health or the environment—the logic of instrumentalist
balancing and cost-benefit optimization might well seem inescapable. Nevertheless, as
this Part describes, the preconditions for reliable balancing and optimization are not
always satisfied in the environmental, health, and safety context. Instead, as the
simplified classification scheme in Figure 1 shows, knowledge conditions can take
53

See Joy, supra note __ (“Among the cognoscenti of nanotechnology, this threat has become
known as the ‘gray goo problem.’ Though masses of uncontrolled replicators need not be gray or gooey,
the term ‘gray goo’ emphasizes that replicators able to obliterate life might be less inspiring than a single
species of crabgrass. They might be superior in an evolutionary sense, but this need not make them
valuable.”).
54
See Adler, supra note __, at 200 (describing “the creation of a new strain of rice fortified with
additional Vitamin A” that may combat “vitamin A deficiency, which can cause blindness and other ills,
[and which] affects up to 250 million children worldwide”).
55
See LOMBORG, supra note __, at 318 (“Despite our intuition that we naturally need to do
something drastic . . . about global warming, economic analyses clearly show that it would be far more
expensive to cut CO2 emission radically than to pay the costs of adaptation to the increased
temperatures.”).
56
See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures, 17 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 179, 186 (2003) (speculating that “specially designed nanodevices, the size of bacteria, might
be programmed to destroy arterial plaque, or fight cancer cells, or repair cellular damage caused by aging”).
57
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1452-1453
(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996); Randall Lutter & John
F. Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 1 (1993); Randall Lutter, John Morrall, & W. Kip Viscusi, The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff
for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 ECON. INQ. 599 (1999); Frank B. Cross, When Environmental
Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOL. L.Q. 729 (1995); Ralph L. Keeney,
Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of Regulations, 8 J. RISK & UNCERT. 95 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi &
Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatality and Injury Costs of Expenditures, 8 J. RISK & UNCERT. 19 (1994).
58
See Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of
Bjorn Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and Policy, 30 ECOL. L. Q. 223,
249-252 (2003) (describing and criticizing the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature).
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diverse forms, ranging from the kind of well-characterized probability and outcome
settings presupposed by CBA to the more stark conditions of uncertainty and ignorance
that attract the attention of PP proponents.59 Thus, a critical challenge for risk regulators
is to ensure that their decisionmaking models are appropriately suited to the nature and
degree of knowledge actually held in a given policy context, whether the models concern
the assessment of ecological or human health hazards, the anticipation of social and
economic consequences, or some more ambitious integration of all such consequences.
Figure 1
Outcomes Well
Defined

Outcomes Poorly
Defined

Probabilities Well
Defined

Risk

Ambiguity

Probabilities Poorly
Defined

Uncertainty

Ignorance

As this Part argues, the PP can be defended as a pragmatic decisionmaking
heuristic that is particularly well-suited to the task of fostering consideration of how best
to safeguard life and the environment under conditions of uncertainty and ignorance.
Contrary to prominent critiques, the PP does not urge regulators “to be universally
precautionary.”60 Instead, the PP focuses on particular categories of harm and separates
them out for special treatment during early stages in the development of human
knowledge and experience. Viewed sympathetically, this asymmetry of concern
represents a procedurally rational mechanism for catalyzing empirical investigation,
redressing political imbalances, and responding with prudence to threats of a potentially
catastrophic or irreversible nature. Indeed, in many real world contexts, heuristic
decisionmaking of the sort embodied in the PP expresses a kind of “ecological
rationality”61—that is, a pragmatic decisionmaking approach that is well-tailored to the
informational and cognitive constraints of actual choice environments and that is capable
of evolving and adapting over time.

59

Adapted from Andy Stirling, The Precautionary Principle in Science and Technology, in
REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note __, at 61, 79. The fourth possibility—
ambiguity—seems only to attract the attention of game show hosts.
60
Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note __, at 1008.
61
See Douglas A. Kysar et al., Are Heuristics a Problem or a Solution?, in HEURISTICS AND THE
LAW (Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer eds., 2005).

12

A.

Complexity

Much of the divide in risk regulation can be understood as a difference of view
over which of the boxes in Figure 1 most accurately describes our policymaking
predicament.62 As J.B. Ruhl has observed, “[t]he prevailing schools of environmental
policy have described our problem as a series of linear, one-dimensional decisionmaking
systems,” an approach that assumes “economic conditions can be translated predictably
into economic conclusions that call for prescribed economic measures, [and]
environmental conditions can be translated predictably into environmental conclusions
that call for environmental measures.”63 If indeed these prevailing schools are correct that
biophysical and sociolegal systems are well-behaved—such that they follow linear
operating rules, map onto normal or Gaussian probability distributions, and exhibit stable
equilibrium outcomes—then data gaps and other shortcomings of human knowledge need
not be viewed as deeply problematic.
If, on the other hand, these systems are complex—such that they exhibit
“behaviors such as feedback, emergence, path dependence, and nonlinearity”64—then risk
regulators face a fundamentally different task. Not only must they assess and manage
risks of an uncertain magnitude, but they must do so within the context of numerous,
overlapping dynamic systems, each of which is characterized by such perplexing features
as extreme sensitivity to minor variations in condition,65 “fat tail” probability
distributions,66 and irreducible levels of uncertainty, or chaos.67 This is a far more

62

Compare David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution for Environmental
Law, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2005) (arguing that hope for revolutionary advances in environmental
standard-setting from the emerging field of toxicogenomics is misplaced); Cary Coglianese & Gary E.
Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2004);
and Wagner, supra note __, with Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 124 (2003) (arguing that, although “pervasive uncertainties are simply assumed by
most scholars to be part of the framework within which environmental law must operate,” developments in
information technology and other scientific fields promise to significantly reduce environmental
uncertainty and increase the likelihood of regulatory efficacy).
63
J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law,
18 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 31, 46 (1999). See also Brian Wynne, Uncertainty and Environmental Learning:
Reconceiving Science and Policy in the Preventive Paradigm, 2 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 111, 111 (1992)
(observing that risk assessment was “originally developed for relatively very well structured mechanical
problems” and that environmental systems, in contrast, “cannot be designed, manipulated and reduced to
within the boundaries of existing analytical knowledge”).
64
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion
in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L. J. 757, 763 (2003). See also Ruhl, supra note __, at 46; J.B. Ruhl,
Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean up the Environment by
Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a
Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the
Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L. J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the
Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and
Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997).
65
See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note __, at 817-19.
66
See Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 152-55 (2003).
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intractable problem setting than has tended to be recognized in the risk regulation debate,
even by those who critique CBA for its Herculean informational demands. Because
complex adaptive systems contain ineliminable uncertainties that cannot be presumed to
be insignificant, such systems by their nature are likely to present ill-posed problems—
that is, problems whose imperviousness to resolution is not driven by deficiencies in our
epistemic position, but rather by features inherent to the problems themselves.
CBA in particular may falter if risk regulation is characterized by complexity and
uncertainty, given that adherence to the synoptic paradigm demands techniques and
strategies for rendering policy spaces quantitatively tractable.68 To critics, the procedures
adopted by proponents of the synoptic paradigm in response to this difficulty often are
analytically and democratically unsatisfying.69 Defenders of CBA frequently respond to
this charge by arguing that alternative approaches also are susceptible to mistake and
manipulation, and that the virtue of CBA is its requirement that regulators exhaustively
identify and analyze the expected consequences of policy proposals. This argument,
however, only explains why regulators should be required to provide a comprehensive
survey of potential policy effects, not why such effects should be aligned along a single
numerical metric. It is the latter requirement that often forces the CBA analyst to adopt
methods of quantification and monetization that attract criticism.
A particularly clear demonstration of the critics’ concern can be seen in certain
quasi-scientific attempts by the FDA to control the scope of the risk assessment process
by adopting a presumption that novel technological processes themselves are unworthy of

67

See id. at 153. This is not to suggest that the systems are indeterminate, but rather that their rules
of operation give rise to stunningly complex and difficult-to-predict interactions. Extremely minor, even
immeasurable variations in conditions between two otherwise identically situated systems—such as the
presence in one system of the proverbial flapping of a butterfly’s wings—can give rise to dramatic
differences in outcome between the two systems only a few evolutionary steps later. The resulting “chaos”
is not randomness per se, but rather “order masquerading as randomness,” a state of being that, although
deterministic, nevertheless remains irreducibly uncertain. GLEICK, supra note __, at 22.
68
See OECD, THE ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS AND POLICIES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 150 (1995) (“The treatment of uncertain risk looms large in environmental appraisal.
Converting uncertainty into risk is essential to make the problem tractable.”); Richard T. Woodward &
Richard C. Bishop, How to Decide When Experts Disagree: Uncertainty-Based Choice Rules in
Environmental Policy, 73 LAND ECON. 492, 505 (1997) (“If one considers a spectrum of choice problems
from pure uncertainty to pure risk, almost all of the attention of economics has been on one extreme . . . .
This has led to policy advice and analysis that either implicitly or explicitly requires policymakers to divine
probability distributions.”).
69
As Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams put it, “Government House utilitarianism” such as that
embodied in CBA risks becoming “an outlook favouring social arrangements under which a utilitarian elite
controls a society in which the majority may not itself share those beliefs.” Amartya Sen & Bernard
Williams, Introduction: Utilitarianism and Beyond, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 1, 16 (Amartya Sen
& Bernard Williams eds., 1982). Sen and Williams refer particularly to the partial disclosure conception of
utilitarianism, in which elites apply the utilitarian calculus to social decisionmaking without disclosing their
method of analysis, given the fear that its cold calculation might undermine the basis of social cohesion
among citizens less capable of such enlightened reason. Compare Richard A. Posner, Our Incompetent
Government, New Republic, Nov. 14, 2005, 23, 26 (decrying “the incapacity of our intellectual class . . . to
think in cost-benefit terms”).

14

heightened scrutiny. As noted above,70 such an assumption underlies the agency’s
determination that nanomaterials in consumer products such as sunscreens do not require
an additional risk assessment if their macroscale counterparts have been previously
evaluated. The assumption also may be located in the “substantial equivalence doctrine”
that the FDA has used in the genetically modified agriculture context, and the
“compositional analysis method” that it has proposed for use in the case of cloned
livestock for human consumption.71 In all three cases, the FDA has made its risk
assessment burden lighter by assuming that novel scientific processes (e.g., nanoscaling,
genetic modification, cloning) are not in themselves cause for regulatory scrutiny or
distinction, but rather only become relevant if they lead to manifest differences in the
physical or compositional characteristics of end products as compared to conventional
counterparts.
The flaws with such an assumption are many.72 For present purposes, the most
significant shortcoming is the assumption’s implicit view that “what we don’t know
won’t hurt us.” On the FDA’s approach, situations of deep uncertainty regarding the
potential impacts of novel technological processes are treated as unworthy of regulatory
attention, an approach that reflects what Wendy Wagner has called the “unprecautionary
principle.”73 In the nanotechnology context, this approach seems especially inapt, given
that scientists believe nanoscale materials are potentially revolutionary precisely because
they display marked differences in chemical and physical behavior as compared to their
macroscale equivalents. Assigning the burden of proof on such issues is therefore an
inherently political exercise, one that should be seen as affecting the distribution of power
and knowledge in society, rather than simply being derived from it.
Proponents of CBA have adopted more nuanced ways of dealing with incomplete
information. Analysts sometimes contend, for instance, that the proper utilitarian
response to situations of uncertainty is not to abandon the quest for optimization, as the
PP appears to require, but instead to estimate and incorporate the costs and benefits of
uncertainty directly into the optimization model. Although preferable to the FDA’s blunt
refusal to acknowledge uncertainty, this procedure still suffers from a basic limitation:
Without knowing the expected value of future knowledge (which depends on the same
unknown probabilities and outcomes that render the situation imperfectly characterized
for purposes of risk assessment and CBA), the analyst cannot identify the point at which
broadened regulatory inspection itself is no longer cost-justified. Unwilling to concede
uncertainty and ignorance, the analyst instead teeters on the edge of an infinite regress.74
In the context of complex adaptive systems, this problem is especially acute because the
analyst cannot rely on a constant trend of diminishing returns from knowledge

70

See supra text accompanying note 10.
See Kysar, Preferences for Processes, supra note __.
72
See id.
73
Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6 HUM.
& ECOL. RISK ASSESSMENT 459, 466-68 (2000).
74
See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK 39, 7374 (1998) (referring to the “optimal stopping problem” raised by such dilemmas).
71
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acquisition, given the possibility that minor perturbations in one period may give rise to
dramatic effects many periods hence.
Introducing genetically modified organisms or nanomaterials widely into field
environments raises similar concerns, given the practically irreversible nature of such
actions. For such decisions, proponents of CBA typically argue that the expectation
calculus should be expanded to include whatever “option value” would be lost by
engaging in an irreversible action with uncertain effects.75 For instance, one of the
earliest and most significant papers in the environmental economics literature began by
observing, “[I]f we are uncertain about the payoff to investment in development, we
should err on the side of underinvestment, rather than overinvestment, since development
is irreversible.”76 Proponents of the PP would, of course, wholeheartedly agree. They
would not agree, however, that the option value of this precaution should simply be
priced and incorporated into the efficiency calculus so that CBA can continue in “the
usual way.”77 To PP adherents, such an exercise invites exclusionary, technocratic
decisionmaking in the face of grave, uncertain collective choices—precisely the type of
context that they believe instead requires inclusiveness, transparency, and candid
acknowledgment that moral choices are being undertaken.78
Most obviously susceptible to this critique is Delphi analysis, which is one
prominent analytical method used by CBA practitioners to get the consequentialistutilitarian ball rolling, despite the presence of true uncertainty. The Delphi technique
consists essentially of gathering subjective assessments of unknown risks from a survey
of experts in relevant fields. By then searching for a point of convergence among the
expert responses, analysts hope to assign a Bayesian prior subjective belief that, in turn,
will afford some nonarbitrary basis for taking a “first stab” at calculating expected
outcomes.79 Proponents of CBA sometimes even deny that there is such a thing as
uncertainty, apparently taking the view that if Bayesian rather than frequentist probability
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See Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and
Irreversibility, 88 Q. J. ECON. 312 (1974); C. Henry, Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The
Irreversibility Effect, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1066 (1974). For a leading efficiency model incorporating option
values, see A. Myrick Freeman, The Sign and Size of Option Value, 60 LAND ECON. 1 (1984).
76

See Arrow & Fisher, supra note __, at 317.
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Id. at 319.
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See Wynne, supra note __, at 115 (arguing that “institutionalized exaggeration of the scope and
power of scientific knowledge creates a vacuum in which should exist a vital social discourse about the
conditions and boundaries of scientific knowledge in relation to moral and social knowledge”).
79
For discussion of Bayesian probability theory, see Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual
Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Regulation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (2005); David E. Adelman,
Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental
Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497 (2004); Stephen Charest, Bayesian Approaches to the Precautionary
Principle, 12 DUKE ENV. L. & POL’Y F. 265 (2002). As Charest points out, the Bayesian approach may be
an improvement over risk assessment techniques that incorporate subjective assumptions through less
transparent means.
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theory is adopted, some number always will be available to the cost-benefit optimizer.80
The question immediately raised, however, is whose subjective probability assessments
will form the basis of the Bayesian exercise. Without devoting careful attention to
concerns of inclusiveness and participatory legitimacy, environmental policymakers risk
obscuring essentially normative judgments through an exercise that, when properly
understood, often merits only a weak case for deference.81
Other approaches used by CBA practitioners when faced with true uncertainty
include Monte Carlo analysis and similar statistical methods for generating hypothetical
distributions of unknown probabilities. These computer techniques evaluate the effects of
policy proposals under thousands of different states of the world such that, even in the
face of uncertainty, analysts may be able to locate policy prescriptions that predominate
over a wide range of possible conditions.82 Such techniques depend, however, on the
specification of certain assumptions about the theoretical nature of unknown probabilities
and, in keeping with the classical scientific tradition, analysts typically specify normal or
Gaussian probability behavior.83 When applied to systems that behave instead according
to the laws of complexity, such assumptions can lead to dramatically erroneous policy
advice, despite the great technological sophistication of the Monte Carlo procedure.84
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See Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, __ U. CHI.
L. REV. __ (2006) (stating that the authors “are not sure that Knightian uncertainty is a meaningful
category”).
81
Scholars from the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, for instance, have
proposed the use of Delphi techniques to fill data gaps in regulatory analysis, yet their own use of the
methodology to argue against the desirability of environmental, health, and safety regulation raises cause
for skepticism. See Robert W. Hahn & Rohit Malik, Is Regulation Good for You?, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 893, 898 n.21 (2005). In what amounts to an ad hoc opinion poll, “leading regulatory economists”
were asked to estimate the percentage of major environmental, health, and safety regulations implemented
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See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 184 (1994). For a discussion of how Monte Carlo procedures are used in toxic risk assessment,
see Susan R. Poulter, Monte Carlo Procedures in Environmental Risk Assessment—Science, Policy and
Legal Issues, 9 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV. 7 (1998).
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See Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, The Value of Formal Quantitative Assessment of
Uncertainty in Regulatory Analysis, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Analysis Related
Publication 04-22 (Sept. 2004).
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A salient example from finance theory helps to elucidate this point. Reflecting their classical
assumptions, conventional models of financial markets tend to deny the likelihood that stock market
crashes will occur with the magnitude that we have, nonetheless, experienced on multiple occasions in the
previous century. See BENOIT MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS
(2004). This denial could be explained in one of two ways. On the one hand, we could be experiencing
inconceivably bad luck during this period in our history such that later, when averaged over subsequent
crash-free millennia, the infinitesimal risk predicted by Gaussian financial models will turn out to be
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B.

Catastrophe

Criticisms of CBA’s efforts to grapple with complexity and uncertainty have
particular purchase in the case of potentially catastrophic risks. As Judge Richard
Posner’s recent book notes, humanity faces a number of threats of uncertain, but possibly
monumental consequence, including some threats that might entail the erasure of all life
on the planet.85 In the face of such complete catastrophic threats, conventional
approaches to CBA would, first, sum up the total monetary-equivalent worth of the
expected human population at the time of potential destruction and, second, discount that
number, both for time and for likelihood.86 The resulting number would, of course, be
finite. It might also be quite small, particularly if the anticipated disaster looms far in the
future or with minute probability. One could increase the number to reflect a degree of
risk aversion, but the result still would be finite and, if cost-benefit analyses of climate
change are an indication,87 not alarmingly large.
The question then arises whether the expectation calculus of CBA is appropriately
textured for the type of decision actually being confronted. We have ruled out infinite
values by assumption88 and our methodology devotes only indirect attention to variance,
through the risk aversion adjustment. As a result, we have come to contemplate the “end
vindicated. On the other hand, it could be that our models are wrong and that, as Daniel Farber puts it, “it is
reasonably foreseeable that non-reasonably foreseeable events will occur from time to time.” Farber, supra
note __, at 146.
85
See POSNER, CATASTROPHE, supra note __, at 20-21 (noting that “[t]he number of extreme
catastrophes that have a more than negligible probability of occurring in this century is alarmingly great,
and their variety startling”).
86
Initially, one might expect that CBA would value an outcome of complete destruction at
precisely zero, given that CBA tends to measure all welfare consequences from the perspective of
individual preferences and, by assumption, no individuals would remain to express such preferences
following an apocalyptic event. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 151-152 (observing that some CBA
proponents argue present generations have no moral obligations at all with regard to future generations). As
Matthew Adler has argued, however, death can be thought of as a welfare setback, even for the person who
expires. See Adler, supra note __, at __-__. The thought project forces the analyst to determine whether
utility is better assessed ex ante or ex post. In this case, given the hypothesized annihilation of all potential
evaluators, only ex ante figures could be used. As Adler notes, economists in general tend to use ex ante
preference assessments. See id. at __. Psychologists, on the other hand, find large and systematic deviations
between the two assessment frames, raising in the process important questions about the nature of utility
and well-being. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY (1999).
87
See Kysar Climate Change, supra note __.
88
The tenets of rational choice theory break down when applied to gambles involving infinite
value stakes. Most notably, the standard rationality assumption of continuity, which ensures that
individuals can make tradeoffs between all relevant outcomes, is violated by the introduction of infinite
utility outcomes. Scholars tend to respond to this complication either by developing entirely new
formulations of decision theory that are capable of grappling with infinite utilities, or simply by ruling such
utilities inadmissible in order to maintain the theoretical consistency of their framework. The former
approach requires abandoning much of the conventional statistical approach to decisionmaking, including
the laws of large numbers and, correspondingly, confidence that the concepts of expectation and risk
aversion together provide a satisfactory guide for decisionmaking. The latter approach is obviously more
theoretically tidy, but seems unacceptable so long as the idea of infinite values appears both meaningful
and practically relevant to some actual decisions.
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of life as we know it” with a soberness that might appear, to many, irrational. Unlike
repeat-play monetary gambles, for which probabilistically-determined outcomes provide
an invaluable source of information, expectation seems to provide a poor decision guide
for irreversible or catastrophic events. Put bluntly, either nanotechnology will transform
the planet into “gray goo” or it will not. We do not know what the precise probabilities
involved are, but given the nature of discontinuity, we do know that the expected utility
outcome—the weighted average of these extremes—will not occur.89 Thus, by displacing
context-sensitive discussion of precisely what outcomes are being gambled in favor of
what gains and for which winners and losers, the CBA approach tends to understate the
challenge posed by long-term catastrophic risks.
In light of such concerns, one might be tempted to carve out irreversible or
catastrophic risks for special treatment, leaving CBA to serve as the predominant method
for evaluating more routine environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking.90 The
teachings of complexity theory, however, suggest that much of our understanding of
“routine” risk regulation is misguided. The problem of irreversibility, for instance, should
not be seen as restricted to one-shot disaster scenarios. Rather, given the presence of
sensitivity, feedback loops, and other features of path dependence, some degree of
irreversibility should be expected to characterize all decision nodes within complex
adaptive systems.91 Indeed, if the teachings of complexity theory are sound, then
environmental, health, and safety dilemmas will, almost by definition, present ill-posed
problems that contain “nasty surprises”92 and other computationally intractable features.
As the next Section explains, such features of complex, adaptive systems raise the
possibility that pragmatic decisionmaking procedures such as the PP may prove more
“ecologically rational” than formal analytical devices such as CBA.

89

As Posner notes, “by definition, all but the last doomsday prediction is false.” POSNER,
CATASTROPHE, supra note __, at 13. The standard view of CBA defenders instead seems to be that, “We
live in a continuous world.” Robert H. Frank, Why is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 77, 78 (2000).
90
See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment; Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible
and Catastrophic.
91
Sunstein argues further that irreversibilities should be seen to lie “on all sides” of the risk
regulation equation, given that precautionary regulations may create their own irreversible effects, such as
“increased dependence on nuclear energy” in the case of greenhouse gas mitigation policies. Sunstein,
Irreversible and Catastrophic, supra note __, at 20. This argument appears to embrace the teachings of
complexity theory, in the sense that systems such as the atmosphere or the regulated market are seen as
likely to exhibit path dependency, feedback effects, and other tendencies toward irreversibility. Sunstein
does not, however, engage the broader challenge posed by complexity theory to synoptic decisionmaking
approaches such as CBA. Like the radical commensurability implications of the “risk-risk,” “healthhealth,” and “environment-environment” arguments, see supra text accompanying notes 57-58, Sunstein’s
“irreversibility-irreversibility” argument challenges far more than simply the conceptual underpinnings of
the PP. It also problematizes the very basis on which moral decisionmaking gains traction, since it serves to
erode the conceptions of distinctive human agency that underwrite a great deal of our moral reasoning and
provide the fulcrum on which it ultimately depends. See infra text accompanying notes 210-224-.
92
Farber, supra note __, at __.
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C.

Procedural Rationality

In the context of complex, adaptive systems, the deliberate attempt to optimize
may not represent simply an imperfect but useful aid to decisionmaking, as CBA
defenders often assert.93 Rather, it may represent a solution concept that is poorly
matched for the problem tasks at hand. In the face of ill-posed problems, we cannot
confidently expect that the errors of CBA will cluster around an “optimal” result—
indeed, for such problems the very notion of an optimum eludes meaningful description.
The errors of CBA therefore are capable of deviating substantially and unpredictably
from decision paths that are easily identified as desirable—if not necessarily optimal—
through less formalistic decision procedures. In light of such concerns, proponents of the
PP consciously part ways with the technocratic paradigm underlying risk assessment and
CBA. Rather than insist on quantification as a predicate to decisionmaking,94 they instead
argue that environmental, health, and safety regulation should become infused with a
“culture of humility about the sufficiency and accuracy of existing knowledge.”95
As it turns out, the United States has enjoyed a long and successful experience
with precisely this approach. Despite the current prominence of CBA among U.S.
policymakers and academics, much of U.S. environmental law and regulation continues
to be based instead on policies and procedures that reflect a precautionary approach. In
several key pollution control areas, for instance, the United States has forsaken
optimization in favor of a precautionary practice of requiring installation of the best
available pollution abatement technology,96 often with opt-out procedures extended to
93

See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note __, at 149 (defending CBA for its ability to
“produce useful information” and “increase the coherence of programs that would otherwise be a product
of some combination of fear, neglect and interest group power”); SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note
__, at ix (“[C]ost-benefit analysis should be seen as a simple pragmatic tool, designed to promote better
appreciation of the consequences of regulation.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE
FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 25-26 (2002) (“The strongest arguments for CBA seem to rest not
with neoclassical economics but with common sense, informed by behavioral economics and cognitive
psychology.”).
94
Hahn and Malik are particularly stubborn on this point. After noting that many federal
regulations offer benefits that have been left unquantified by adopting agencies, the authors first skeptically
observe that “[t]he question naturally arises as to whether there are really benefits to those regulations.”
Hahn & Malik, supra note __, at 895. Then, as part of their effort to assess the costs and benefits of major
regulations, the authors simply assign “zero benefits” to those regulations for which benefits were left
unquantified by the relevant agency. See id. at 898. To defend this procedure, Hahn and Malik state that
“any other assumption seems totally arbitrary.” Id. But assigning zero is no more or less arbitrary than
assigning any other number would be in this situation. Instead, what is truly arbitrary is insisting on a
quantified value under circumstances in which quantification cannot reliably proceed. See Woodward &
Bishop, supra note __, at 506 (arguing that “if the decision maker does not possess well-defined
probabilities, then the use of ad hoc probabilities is not rational”).
95
Stirling, supra note __, at 66. See also Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992).
96
As Richard Stewart has noted, one frequently offered interpretation of the PP is that best
available pollution technology requirements should be imposed on all proponents of activities with
uncertain environmental, health, or safety threats. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory
Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, in 20 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 71, 78 (Timothy Swanson
ed., 2002).
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firms that are able to demonstrate achievement of equal abatement
alternative technologies.97 This simple heuristic—in essence, “do the best
implies great collective commitment to the preservation of human
environment without requiring satisfaction of Herculean informational
regulators.99

levels using
you can”98—
life and the
demands by

Realistic but unquantifiable threats of catastrophic loss present an additional case
in which heuristic decisionmaking procedures may prove more pragmatically sensible
than deliberate cost-benefit optimization. With regard to climate change, for instance,
future generations may reflect with marvel on our present day attempts to meticulously
calculate the costs and benefits of greenhouse policies. Such studies typically lead to a
conclusion that the economic benefits of continued fossil fuel consumption more than
outweigh the physical, agricultural, and ecological costs that would be averted by
restricting emissions, at least for the next few decades. Accordingly, the optimal carbon
reduction policy under CBA is a rather limited one that should not begin any time
soon.100 The important lesson from complexity theory, again, is that the apparent CBA
consensus on climate change may not merely be wrong; it may be wildly wrong.
Especially in light of the relatively minor cost associated with implementing most
97

See Bodansky, The Precautionary Principle in US Environmental Law (1994). See also Adam
Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 125 (2003) (“The
requirement of best available technology embodies a policy judgment as attractive as apple pie.”); Thomas
O. McGarity, The Goals of Environmental Legislation, 31 BOSTON COLLEGE ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 529,
538-545 (2004) (reviewing examples); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards,
2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 83 (attributing much of the success of pollution reduction in the modern environmental
era to technology-based standards); Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267,
1283-84 (1985) (noting Congress repeatedly “chose to emphasize the need for prompt injury prevention
over the need for an optimal balance between regulatory benefits and costs” in its landmark 1970s
legislation). Significant early environmental court decisions also emphasized the precautionary basis of
U.S. risk regulation. See Reserve Mining Co. v. E.P.A., 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A.,
541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
98
See Wagner, supra note __, at 92.
99
Moreover, in practice, the approach tends to produce results similar to those of a “knee of the
cost curve” decisionmaking heuristic, in which pollution abatement is required at least to the point at which
marginal returns from further abatement begin to steeply decline. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal
Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONT. PROB. 57 (1991). In this manner, the “best available
control technology” requirement demonstrates some cost-sensitivity (or proportionality) without depending
on unrealistic and controversial assumptions regarding the ability of regulators to equalize the marginal
costs and benefits of abatement. The policy standard instead assumes that the hazards of pollution are
sufficiently severe and unpredictable that only the “best” effort at prevention will suffice. Such an
aspirational standard should not be seen as reflecting a naïve belief in the possibility of a “zero risk”
society. See W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 431, 465 (1995). Instead it reflects a sensitive appreciation both of the practical
difficulties of crafting, defending, and enforcing pollution control standards, and of the deeply moral
connotations that our legal pronouncements entail. See infra text accompanying notes 168-169 (discussing
the “moral remainder” that accompanies the tragic choices entailed by risk regulation and that cannot be
subsumed by the cost-benefit procedure).
100
See LOMBORG, supra note __, at 318 (noting that “economic analyses clearly show that it will
be far more expensive to cut CO2 emission radically than to pay the costs of adaptation to the increased
temperatures”).
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proposed carbon emissions abatement policies, uncertain but potentially catastrophic
consequences of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions should not simply be reduced
to an expectation value and included within cost-benefit calculation.101
Along these lines, a growing number of scientists and policymakers have begun to
focus attention on the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that is
hoped to be sufficiently low to eliminate the possibility of truly disastrous climate change
scenarios.102 By advocating the limitation of human emissions to a point that will avoid
exceeding this critical level whatever the cost, proponents eschew optimization and
instead adopt something more closely resembling the “safe minimum standards”
approach that is familiar from the economic literature on endangered species
regulation.103 Recognizing that climate change, like species preservation, is characterized
by uncertainty, irreversibilities, critical thresholds, and other hallmark features of
complexity, proponents argue that society should establish “safe minimum standards . . .
for protecting Earth’s life-support systems in the face of virtually inevitable unpleasant
surprises.”104
This “safe minimum standards” approach has long been associated with the PP.105
One also may think of the “safe minimum standards” approach as resembling the
maximin principle from decision theory, which counsels minimization of the maximum
possible loss when decisionmakers are faced with policy choices that are characterized by
true uncertainty.106 Most famously discussed by John Rawls in the context of elaborating
an egalitarian theory of justice,107 the maximin principle reflects what would be termed
an extreme degree of risk aversion if probabilistic information on outcomes were actually
available, given that the principle focuses attention exclusively on the worst case
outcome from each possible course of action under inspection. For this reason, the
principle has attracted a substantial share of criticism.108 Nevertheless, at least as a
101

See Kysar, Climate Change, supra note __.
See id.
103
Richard C. Bishop, Endangered Species And Uncertainty: The Economics Of A Safe Minimum
Standard, AM. J. AGRICULTURE ECON. 10 (Feb., 1978); S.V. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, RESOURCE
CONSERVATION: ECONOMICS AND POLICIES (1st ed., 1952). See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or
Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Case for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1159-63 (1999)
(reviewing and critiquing the “safe minimum standards” literature).
104
Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecological Economics and the Carrying Capacity of the Earth, in NATURAL
CAPITAL: THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SUSTAINABILITY 38, 49 (A. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, &
Robert Costanza, eds., 1994).
105
See T.M. Crowards, Combining Economics, Ecology and Philosophy: Safe Minimum Standards
of Environmental Protection, in VALUATION AND ENVIRONMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (M.
O’Connor & C. Spash, eds., 1997); O’Riordan, Jordan & Cameron, supra note __, at 23.
106
Indeed, as Sunstein notes, the maximin principle shares much conceptual space with the PP,
given that both principles direct “officials to identify the worst case among the various options, and to
select that option whose worst case is least bad.” Sunstein, supra note __, at 1033.
107
But see Derek Parfit & John Broome, Rawlsian Principles, in DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND
PERSONS 490-493 (1984) (observing an important, but subtle conceptual distinction between Rawls’s
difference principle and maximin).
108
See John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of
John Rawls’s Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594 (1975). Much of this criticism, however, overlooks the
102
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preliminary stance, proponents of the PP believe that an extreme level of risk aversion is
appropriate for policymaking that concerns unknown but potentially devastating threats
to the global climate, the ozone layer, biodiversity, and other natural systems that are
thought to be of fundamental and irreplaceable importance to humanity.
Whether characterized as the PP, the best available technology requirement, the
safe minimum standard, or the maximin principle, each of these related decisionmaking
techniques reflects an awareness that truly rational risk regulation sometimes requires
officials to abandon the quest for optimization in favor of less ambitious, more
pragmatically sensible approaches. Of course, the extreme conservatism of these
approaches begs the questions of when and how to relax their dictates in favor of more
permissive standards. According to many PP supporters, however, fostering such an
adaptive approach to risk regulation is precisely the point of the PP—something that the
principle’s critics seem reluctant to acknowledge. Unlike the optimization framework of
CBA, which must resort to awkward analytical devices in the presence of imperfectly
characterized risks, the PP’s incremental approach reflects great sensitivity to the fact that
effective decisionmaking in the face of many problems demands procedural
rationality.109
The policymaking paradigm of “adaptive management” often is seen as a natural
candidate to provide the kind of incremental, dynamic decisionmaking procedure
envisioned by PP proponents.110 Pioneered by biologist C.S. Holling,111 adaptive
management is an application of “the concept of experimentation to the design and
implementation of natural-resource and environmental policies.”112 Because uncertainty
and evolutionary change are presumed to be foundational characteristics of both
biophysical and sociolegal systems, the adaptive management approach does not seek to
identify static “optimal” equilibria. Instead, it aims to utilize constant feedback and
conditions that Rawls presupposed for appropriate use of the maximin principle: settings of true uncertainty
involving a worst-case outcome of “grave risks” which could be avoided by sacrificing a potential gain that
is of comparatively insubstantial moment. PP proponents believe that current environmental policy issues
such as climate change fit these conditions well. See supra text accompanying notes 101-104.
109
See BRIAN J. LOASBY, CHOICE, COMPLEXITY AND IGNORANCE: AN ENQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC
THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF DECISION-MAKING 220 (1976) (“A theory which takes serious account of
time and ignorance must be a theory of processes, not of states—and not even of dynamic states.”);
Schrader-Frechette, supra note __, at 27 (“Decision-theoretic rules under uncertainty require scientists to
take account of the fairness of the allocation process, not merely the outcomes.”).
110
See A. Dan Tarlock, Is There A There There In Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 213, 252 (2004) (“The precautionary principle needs to be linked to the idea of adaptive
management. The existence of monitoring and adaptive feed-back mechanisms should be a major factor in
validating the decision to limit an activity when the adverse impacts are uncertain.”).
111

See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).
See KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE 53 (1993). See also JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B.
RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (2002); Norman L. Christensen, The
Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management,
6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665 (1996) (describing ecosystem management as “driven by explicit goals,
executed by policies, protocols, and practices, and made adaptable by monitoring and research based on our
112
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experimentation in order to ensure the long-run sustainability of vital ecological
processes. The concept of sustainability, in turn, entails judgments that cross not only the
boundaries between scientific disciplines, but also the real and imagined boundaries that
exist between science and politics.113 The ultimate aim of adaptive management,
therefore, is the rather grandiose one of “integrat[ing] scientific knowledge of ecological
relationships within a complex sociopolitical and values framework toward the general
goal of protecting native ecosystem integrity over the long term” 114
As part of this “complex sociopolitical and values framework”, proponents
believe that the PP can play a central information-forcing role. Unlike their CBA
counterparts, proponents of the PP recognize that uncertainty itself is a subject of power,
influence, and control within economically advanced societies. Thus, the content of
scientific knowledge and the manner of its production are not treated exogenously by the
PP, but instead are made a central focus of the regulatory program. Shifting the burden of
proof onto the promoters of new technologies and activities, as many proponents of the
PP urge, serves the practical purpose of providing incentives for research and
understanding by those parties who are thought to be best able to develop knowledge of
imperfectly characterized threats.115 The CBA/risk assessment paradigm, in contrast,
seems to assume that scientific uncertainty—the single most salient feature of
environmental, health, and safety regulation—is simply addressed “out there.”116 There
are great opportunity costs to such epistemic bravado, for the regulatory approval process
itself can offer a powerful institutional mechanism for reducing the scientific
uncertainties that riddle environmental, health, and safety law.117

best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes necessary to sustain ecosystem composition,
structure, and function”).
113
See Kysar, Sustainable Development, supra note __.
114
R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 31
(1994).
115
See Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 191, 194 (2004) (observing that precautionary regulatory approaches such as absolute standards
“perform a crucial power-shifting function, leveling the political playing field between diffuse and
powerless public interests and concentrated monied corporate interests”).
116
Cf. Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce
Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L. J. 1619 (2004) (criticizing “the failure of
environmental laws to require production of basic information about the harms caused by polluting
activities and hazardous products”).
117
No doubt, proponents of optimization would protest that uncertainties exist on both the risk and
benefit sides of such dilemmas. Market actors, however, already have strong incentives to demonstrate (and
to capture) the benefits of their activities and technologies. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000).
In that sense, the PP’s asymmetry of regulatory concern can be seen as responding to an underlying
asymmetry of knowledge incentives within the unregulated market.
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II.

THE PROBLEM OF VALUATION

As Gödel famously demonstrated, no formal system of minimal complexity can
be both consistent and complete.118 Because consistency generally is taken to capture the
essence of rationality, practitioners of CBA respond to Gödel’s challenge by sacrificing
completeness in their formal analytical framework; that is, they treat certain decision
criteria as externally given in order to maintain the consistency of their CBA outputs.119
Thus, despite the widespread view that CBA encompasses a broader range of concerns
than the PP, it is only the CBA procedure that must—by its very nature—ignore at least
some parameters of a given decisionmaking context. Practitioners of CBA generally
attempt to minimize this complication by exogenizing elements that are thought to be of
little practical import or that are believed to be adequately addressed by other institutional
mechanisms. The problem with this otherwise sensible strategy is that, increasingly, CBA
is being offered for use in choice settings where the variables exogenized are of deep and
unmistakable significance to the very decision under inspection, and where the potential
role of alternative governance mechanisms is being displaced by the CBA exercise itself.
As described in the previous Part, especially troubling in their exclusion are
questions concerning how the relevant political community should behave in the face of
uncertainty regarding potentially irreversible or catastrophic consequences of human
action. Equally troublesome are questions concerning, first, how the political community
should respond to the fact that not only private values, but also social meanings
sometimes are affected by new technologies, shared experiences, or collective
decisionmaking processes; and, second, how the community should regard non-nationals,
future generations, and other interest-holders that are not already granted full membership
in the community of individuals who supply the raw material for the interest-optimization
calculus. Both of these sets of questions require mechanisms for fostering democratic
dialogue and developing new collective norms of responsibility. Yet, as this Part
demonstrates, the questions are subtly taken by CBA as having already been answered—
an approach that might not be so worrisome if the answers presumed were not so
confused and misleading.
A.

Emergence

CBA practitioners conventionally adopt a preferentialist account of welfare in
which individuals’ revealed or hypothesized preferences are taken to supply the exclusive
criterion for valuing the expected consequences of social choice. Yet, as Mark Sagoff has
argued, CBA practitioners have no non-normative procedure for deriving individual
118

See Kurt Gödel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related
Systems (1931). See also Guiseppe Dari Mattiacci, Gödel, Kaplow, Shavell: Consistency and Completeness
in Social Decisionmaking; PAUL W. GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE
OF NEUROECONOMICS 72 (2003); JOHN D. BARROW, IMPOSSIBILITY: THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE AND THE
SCIENCE OF LIMITS 218-247 (1998).
119
Cf. CLIVE L. SPASH, GREENHOUSE ECONOMICS: VALUES AND ETHICS 267 (2002) (“Optimality .
. . is in fact consistency analysis and the best outcome is not guaranteed by the model, but only the choice
that is consistent with the assumptions.”).
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preference functions.120 That is, despite the oft-heard claim that revealed preference
studies represent “in fact reflections of individual preferences, and hence utility,”121 the
interpretation of observed behavior is actually a slippery exercise in which the analyst
must adopt a series of assumptions about the available opportunities and choice criteria
that confront observed individuals. At times, these assumptions appear to rest more on
personal introspection and professional custom than on sustained engagement with the
actual circumstances of observed individuals. As Sagoff puts it, “[c]hoice is at best a
conceptual construct inferred from ad hoc descriptions of behavior—descriptions that
themselves presuppose beliefs about available options and therefore about
preferences.”122
To give one pertinent example, many of the data problems found in controversial
employment market value-of-life studies—which provide empirical estimates for use in
policymaking of individuals’ willingness-to-pay to avoid risks of death or injury to
themselves—arise from the fact that the United States has managed to drastically reduce
its occupational hazard levels over the course of the past century. For this reason, the
remaining segments of the economy that exhibit an occupational mortality rate high
enough to support the wage-risk premium methodology tend to be segments populated by
those with the least social, economic, and political capital—variables that themselves can
be expected to influence the opportunity set and the resulting preference orderings of
observed individuals.123 Thus, what the CBA analyst regards as choice (and hence
preference (and hence utility)), may actually better capture the analyst’s own inclination
to treat pre-existing power relations in employment markets as normatively privileged.124
Further room for normative confusion under CBA arises from the counterfactual
nature of opportunity cost assessment. Not only are CBA values typically derived from
debatable preference elicitation procedures, but they also are chosen from a class of
foregone benefits that tends to be bounded only by the analyst’s imagination.125 In such
120

See SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note __, at 57-79.
W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 849 (2000) (emphasis added). Compare
Amartya Sen, Rational Fools, in CHOICE, WELFARE, AND MEASUREMENT 84-106 (1982).
122
SAGOFF, supra note __, at 77.
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According to one study, for instance, the implicit value-of-life revealed by wage-risk
interactions appears to be several million dollars higher for union workers than for non-union workers,
holding constant other significant variables. See Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstron, Wage Compenation for
Dangerous Work Revisited, 52 INDUSTRY & LABOR RELATIONS REV. 116, 133 (1998). See also W. Kip
Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843 (2000); ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note __, at 79;
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH 99-100 (2003).
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Indeed, whether or not preferentialist in form, the reference case for defining and measuring
welfare consequences of social choice tends to remain unequivocally focused on the status quo under CBA.
See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DRAFT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION
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circumstances, the line between modeling and manipulating becomes a fine one. In one
prominent study of climate change, for instance, the analyst’s decision to add a variable
representing enhanced recreation opportunities in a warmer world resulted in monetized
benefits that tended to swamp the impact of estimated morbidity and mortality.126 Apart
from being unduly wooden—why assume, after all, that individuals will continue to value
mountain biking at the same amount if they know that their extra days of recreation have
been funded through an increase in malaria among the equatorial poor?—this exercise
also is open to considerable error and abuse. In a real sense, climate change has the
potential to affect every biophysical and sociolegal system on the planet, systems about
which our present understanding is highly incomplete and imperfect. To select among
such effects and portray the resulting calculation as objective is convincing only because
the ritual comports with our deeply ingrained desire to avoid the specter of openly
collective decisionmaking.
This is not to suggest that the analyst could, even in theory, conduct a
thoroughgoing preferentialist account of climate change. The degrees of uncertainty in
the relevant parameters—and the degrees of freedom available to the cost-benefit analyst
in choosing which aspects of which systems to hold constant—render the project fanciful.
Nor is it merely a problem of adopting preferentialism as the relevant welfare criterion.
The problem instead lies with any form of methodological individualism. Just as certain
attributes and behaviors of complex, adaptive biophysical systems cannot be predicted by
examining individual system components alone, certain values and aims of the “social
organism”127 cannot be identified or predicted through the simple aggregation of
atomized preferences or interests.128 Instead, those values and aims in part emerge
through the operation of social institutions and procedures themselves. As Laurence Tribe
observes, “the whole point of personal or social choice in many situations is not to
implement a given system of values in light of the perceived facts, but rather to define,
and sometimes deliberately to reshape, the values—and hence the identity—of the
individual or community that is engaged in the process of choosing.”129
Collective procedures of this nature tend to be seen as illiberal or paternalistic. It
is true, of course, that “if regulators reject people’s actual judgments, then they are
cannot be observed and objectified and, more importantly, it cannot be measured in such a way as to allow
comparisons over wholly different choice settings.”).
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insulting their dignity.”130 Yet there is insult also in attributing meaning and significance
to behavior that individuals themselves may not desire or intend. For many pressing
environmental and risk regulation issues, individual preferences are likely to be nonexistent or ill-formed in the absence of an appropriate forum for discussing and
determining social goals. For instance, simply toting up the “revealed” preferences of
individuals regarding the myriad potential consequences of cloning livestock for human
consumption131 seems, at least at present, to be an incurably contrived exercise. We will
not know our preferences with respect to cloned livestock unless and until we have a
body of relevant experience from which to draw upon in our evaluations. Such
experience will only occur with the prior consent of our political community, whether
actively or passively granted. Thus, except perhaps as a method of curtailing collective
debate, it makes little sense at present to hinge policies regarding cloned livestock on our
imagined preferences.
The deliberative deficit of methodological individualism is also evident in Judge
Posner’s recent use of CBA to suggest that the optimal post-Katrina reconstruction plan
for New Orleans is one in which “the historic portions of the city (the French Quarter and
the Garden District) might be rebuilt and preserved as a tourist site, much like Colonial
Williamsburg, without having to be part of a city.”132 Posner may well be right that the
United States should not spend billions of dollars reconstructing New Orleans to its
former scale, especially in light of projected sea level rises over the next century from
climate change that would transform the city into an island. But the reason for this
conclusion is not to be found in a CBA premised on the decontextualized preferences of
individuals. Whatever pre-Katrina tourist behavior might suggest (for it is their
disposable dollars that presumably are driving the conclusion that only the French
Quarter and the Garden District are worth rebuilding), it is an open question whether
individuals post-Katrina agree that they have little use for a revival of the Ninth Ward
and other poor, racially-segregated areas of the city. To say nothing of the deeper issues
of environmental justice raised by the Katrina tragedy, we insult the role of citizenship
when we assume that shared experiences do not affect the preferences that we hold and
the meanings that we attribute to our social world.
B.

Membership

In addition to denying a view of social choice as anything other than an
aggregation of existing interests, CBA also begins with the assumption that all relevant
interest-holders have been identified for purposes of aggregation. In many instances,
however, environmental policymaking will be concerned precisely with determining
which interest-holders are entitled to membership in the political community, and on
what basis their interests are to be considered.133 One long-recognized example concerns
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the appropriate stance toward animals and other non-human life forms.134 As this Section
explains, certain other categories of interest-holders that are of special concern to
environmental policymaking—including statistical victims, non-nationals, and members
of future generations—find themselves ignored or devalued by the CBA procedure in
ways that are inadequately defended. This is not to say that the precautionary approach
provides more clear or appropriate guidance as to how to resolve the ethical and political
issues raised by these missing interest-holders. The PP approach does, however,
explicitly recognize the need for development of new norms of national, global, and
intergenerational environmental responsibility. In contrast, CBA seems to offer the
implicit message that our intellectual needs consist only of better data and more rigorous
techniques of valuation.135
CBA’s deficits in this regards are well demonstrated by the procedure’s treatment
of consent to environmental risks. As noted above, CBA proponents view labor market
revealed preference studies as a sufficient basis for assuming individualized consent to
the imposition of all manner of health and safety risks, a belief that in turn leads them to
argue that CBA does not involve human life or health at all, but instead only the
“monetary equivalents” of such values.136 To the extent that they recognize the analytical
leap implicit in this argument, proponents of CBA defend the leap by noting that most
human health risks from environmental hazards are quite small and, thus, officials safely
can assume that individuals would consent to the risks for a price comparable to the
implicit value of life that is derived from the wage-risk premium literature.137 Not only
does this defense fail to grapple with the fact that individual responses to even actuarially
identical risks vary dramatically based on the risks’ qualitative characteristics,138 but it
also ignores the fact that a variety of adverse health risks associated with pollution and
other hazards are not trivially small.139 To abstract away from such qualitative and
quantitative features of risk in search of a uniform clearing price for life is to deny the
profundity of collective decisionmaking regarding institutionalized harm.
CBA’s limitations in this regard again seem to be driven by the procedure’s
purely individualistic conception of value. Without an identity—and therefore without a
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willingness or even an ability to pay for protection—those lives that are threatened by
statistical risks seem not to represent human lives at all. Statistical risks, however,
represent “none of us” and “all of us” at once.140 Because CBA refuses to see “all of us”
as an interest-holder, it is incapable of treating environmental, health, and safety
regulation with the moral richness that the subject deserves. As Lisa Heinzerling notes,
by pricing human life and sanctioning actions that place it in jeopardy in advance of their
occurrence, “the most basic kind of right—the right to be protected from physical harm
caused by other people, on equal terms with other people—is denied to those whose lives
are framed in statistical terms.”141 Rather than begin with a wholesale level of presumed
consent to the imposition of risk, the PP instead begins with a strong entitlement to bodily
integrity and ecological support, and a corresponding duty on the part of others to avoid
causing serious or irreparable harm to those interests. Difficult questions of
implementation and exception are immediately raised, but the baseline normative
condition under the PP remains one of sanctity for human life, not vulnerability.
A similar tenuousness characterizes the position of non-nationals and other
currently living individuals who stand outside of the particular political community that
engages in a CBA policymaking exercise. After all, one cannot readily conduct a CBA to
determine whether and how the interests of such individuals should be counted for
purposes of conducting CBA.142 Yet a great deal of environmental policymaking and the
pursuit of sustainable development is bound up precisely with the challenge of perceiving
and respecting the interests of globally dispersed populations—populations that, despite
their political dispersion, nonetheless share elaborate networks of ecological and
economic interdependence.143 Increasingly, private individuals are being asked by
international environmental norm entrepreneurs to express regard and concern for the
social and environmental conditions of other nations.144 The state, however, remains the
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critical geopolitical actor for most of environmental law and regulation and, thus, any
policy framework such as CBA that struggles to address extrajurisdictional effects cannot
be regarded as a comprehensive solution to environmental policymaking.145
Finally, and most importantly, CBA’s framework struggles to acknowledge future
generations as interest-holders in themselves, rather than merely as objects of valuation
by the presently living. Scholars have long acknowledged the theoretical difficulties for
moral and political philosophy presented by the topic of intergenerational justice,146 many
of which arise again from the fact that our bedrock normative theories tend to be liberalindividualistic in form. Like children, future generations are part of the “Achilles’ Heel of
liberalism”147—that vulnerable location for interest holders who are imperfectly situated
to identify and assert their rights or interests in the manner that liberalism demands of
them. Future generations are especially burdened in this regard, for not only are they nonexistent, but they also are cognitively obscured even to those presently living, given
liberalism’s tendency to adopt one or another form of methodological individualism.
These limitations are well-demonstrated by what Derek Parfit has termed the nonidentity problem: the fact that whatever policy is selected for a given issue may affect the
very identity of future individuals.148 The non-identity problem is related to, but distinct
from, the problem of endogenous preferences, in which environmental policy is
recognized to have profound effects on the preferences of individuals (including even
previously identified preferences that may have been used to determine the content of
environmental policy).149 In the intergenerational context, it is not merely that
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individuals’ preferences shift as a result of policy choices, but that their very existence is
made contingent on our choices. In such circumstances, we cannot say that future
individuals will be made better or worse off by a policy choice, only that they will be
made.
To the student of complexity theory, this problem of contingent identity is quickly
recognized as a manifestation of the profound endogeneity and interconnectedness of
complex adaptive systems; to the cost-benefit analyst, on the other hand, the problem
appears fundamentally disruptive. Indeed, as Parfit notes, the non-identity problem poses
deep conceptual challenges to any theory of normative ethics that is framed in terms of
the rights, preferences, or interests of particular individuals.150 Such “person-affecting”
normative theories provide little analytical traction in decisionmaking contexts where the
relevant consequences will be felt by entirely different persons depending on how the
decision is resolved. As a result, for such dilemmas, our moral thinking at present is
highly immature. It has, for instance, led to the conclusions that we have no obligations to
future generations whatsoever,151 or that we have only an obligation to ensure that our
choices leave future generations with lives that are minimally worth living.152
In order to avoid such unattractive conclusions, Parfit argues that we need to
move beyond simple “appeal to what is good or bad for those people whom our acts
affect,” and instead to begin developing methods of evaluating “different sets of possible
lives.”153 One promising mechanism for doing so is to conceive of the “communities
which future generations belong to [as] deserving of concern and respect in their own
right.”154 As discussed in Part III, the PP promotes just such a conception by establishing
a standard of agent-relative environmental responsibility, in which human societies and
generations are seen as distinct moral agents that stand in relations of responsibility and
indebtedness to each other. Through such a partial concession to communitarianism, we
can begin to harmonize our liberal individualistic ideals with the reality that some
measure of paternalism and coercion is simply inescapable vis a vis future generations
and other members of liberalism’s Achilles’ Heal.
CBA proponents instead try to dodge this dilemma through the use of an elaborate
mathematical fiction—the discount rate. Although a full discussion of the use of
discounting in the intergenerational policy context is beyond the scope of this Article,155
the practice does deserve brief mention because the effect of discounting future costs and
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benefits to a present value tends to swamp all other variables within long-term CBA.156
Of the various normative justifications that have been offered for the use of discounting,
the most substantively significant is based on the idea that, unless future costs and
benefits are discounted according to a rate that reflects the return on investment offered
by alternative uses of public funds, society will fail to maximize its welfare over time.
Thus, the reduction of future consequences to a present value is thought to ensure that
policymakers will remain mindful of the opportunity costs of regulation, a practice that is
said to be temporally neutral because it leads to the overall maximization of social
welfare, however that welfare happens to be distributed across time.
This conventional justification for the use of discounting within CBA seriously
falters when policymaking includes intergenerational effects, for the very values that are
to be discounted depend on the specification of a background distribution of rights and
responsibilities, and much of environmental law and policy is concerned directly with
establishing that background distribution across generations.157 Thus, we should reject the
contention that “the debate over intergenerational equity should be separated from the
debate over discounting.”158 Through discounting, the fundamental issue of
intergenerational equity—which risks and resources, as an ethical matter, should be
imposed or bestowed on future generations?—is conflated with the issue of
intergenerational efficiency—which generation, as a technical matter based on a given
rate of discount and distribution of resource entitlements, does or will derive more utility
from the use of a given resource? Future generations, in essence, are forced to “outbid”
present owners by an amount reflecting not only the strength of their needs, but also the
alternative uses to which all resources—including the “monetary equivalents” of their
own lives—could be put during the intervening time periods. This is conceptual
confusion.
C.

Discursive Rationality

As noted above,159 the contention of PP proponents that environmental, health,
and safety decisionmaking is characterized by abiding uncertainty does not commit them
to the extreme conservatism of the maximin approach as a general or permanent
response. Rather, the PP is intended to commence a program of risk regulation that is
both proportionate to the scope of the perceived threat and capable of being updated and
adjusted over time. Proponents of the safe minimum standards approach within
environmental economics also tend to qualify their position, arguing that fidelity to safe
minimum standards should yield when the costs of precaution become “immoderate”160
or “unacceptably large.”161 Within the legal literature, Dan Farber similarly allows for
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departure from his strong “environmental baseline” approach to policymaking “when
costs would clearly overwhelm any potential benefits” from precautionary regulation.162
Although critics sometimes argue that these various safety valves suggest a latent
efficiency criterion within the precautionary approach,163 there are important distinctions
that prevent the PP from collapsing into CBA, even granting the addition of some form of
cost sensitivity. To begin with, the PP’s understanding of cost is much broader than the
notion presupposed by CBA.164 As Bishop wrote in a seminal article on the safe
minimum standards approach to endangered species protection, the determination of
“[h]ow much [cost] is ‘unacceptably large’ must necessarily involve more than economic
analysis, because endangered species involve issues of intergenerational equity.”165
Similarly, advocates of the PP typically contemplate an inclusive process for making
determinations about how to apply the principle, suggesting that the decision to relax its
dictates can and should be premised on a range of appropriate reasons beyond simple
welfare-maximization.166 Given the momentous and context-specific ethical implications
of such determinations, PP proponents are simply unwilling to replace considered,
democratic judgments with mechanical devices such as risk aversion or option value
premiums. Instead, such judgments are seen as unavoidably contingent and casespecific.167
There is a deeper problem, as well. Even if mechanical devices of the kind sought
by CBA proponents could be identified, the cost-benefit procedure still would fail to
register the sense of regret that accompanies risk regulation’s tragic choices and that
compels more searching inspection of how to design a society in which such choices are
not as starkly and pervasively posed.168 Lives lost under the “do the best you can”
heuristic and other precautionary approaches are not viewed as efficient “tradeoffs,”
blithely accepted in exchange for whatever utility has been gained. Instead, they are
viewed as tragic, regrettable consequences of human fallibility and finitude—a “moral
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remainder”169 that provides enduring motivation for surviving members of society to seek
ways of doing better in the future. In contrast, because it aspires to comprehensive
rationality, CBA must invariably round this moral remainder to zero and, thus, it must
fail to encourage an appropriate degree of self-awareness regarding the deep normativity
of risk regulation.
A key benefit of the PP, in contrast, is that it contains a built-in sensitivity to the
need for collective deliberation. Even if we know that the PP’s more severe implications
will need to be relaxed, the principle nevertheless forces societal discussion regarding the
normative status of statistical victims, other societies, and future generations.170 In that
regard, the PP’s insistence that human health and the environment deserve constant,
anticipatory attention serves as a procedural lever for furthering still-nascent attempts to
reason through important questions that lie at the “frontiers of justice”—questions about
our responsibilities to members of other nations, other generations, and other species.171
Such an approach therefore aspires not only to be procedurally rational (e.g., in the sense
that dynamic, incremental management approaches are demanded in the face of
complexity and uncertainty in biophysical and sociolegal systems172), but also to be
discursively rational (e.g., in the sense that it helps to structure and promote collective
deliberation regarding decisions for which our existing, individualized preferences are
either ill-formed or ill-suited for the decision under inspection).
Of course, the PP’s desire to encourage inclusive and robust deliberation may not
easily comport with its desire to allow flexible, dynamic regulatory processes. As J.B.
Ruhl has observed, adaptive management may well be inconsistent with traditional
administrative law mechanisms for ensuring robust public participation in regulatory
decisionmaking.173 Moreover, some proponents of adaptive management appear to
envision an expansive normative role for the experts who are placed in charge of
ecosystem management.174 Thus, whether by dint of a mismatch between adaptive
169
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management and the cumbersome processes of public participation, or by dint of an
increasing willingness among experts to inject their normative views into the
management process itself, the goals of procedural and discursive rationality may well be
in tension with each other, even on the more populist-oriented precautionary approach. A
critical task for environmental law going forward, therefore, is to identify an appropriate
division of labor between expert adaptive managers and the broader political community
that enlists their aid in the pursuit of sustainable development.
III.

THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY

At bottom, the distinction between CBA and the PP reflects a distinction between
agent-neutral and agent-relative conceptions of risk regulation. CBA aspires to achieve
complete agent-neutrality at the level of the political community by disclaiming the
relevance of any normative considerations beyond the welfare impacts of regulatory
decisions on individual members of the community. Collective values or aims, in other
words, play no role in the CBA exercise. As Parts I and II demonstrate, however, CBA
must resort to controversial assumptions and exclusions in order to maintain the
perception that morally discretionary choices are not being made within its framework,
apart from the foundational choice to fix collective decisionmaking upon the aggregation
of individual welfare consequences.
Indeed, as an indication of the degree of confusion in this area, some CBA
proponents even attempt to deny that individual welfare maximization is a moral choice
at all. They state, for instance, that their analysis of “risk equity will not be from the
standpoint of moral criteria but rather social welfare maximization.”175 Similarly, they
express a belief that “the moral debates [over discounting in the intergenerational policy
context] can be bracketed by investigating people’s actual preferences in this domain.”176
The analyst wants to reassure herself that she is merely conduct a “technical” and
“objective” task of identifying and tabulating welfare consequences of policymaking, but
any effort to actually define, construct, and implement a social welfare function entails
extraordinarily difficult normative—and political—judgments. The dichotomy of fairness
versus welfare only arises after the analyst has first defined welfare using criteria of
justice . . . and fairness.
These are familiar debates. As this Part observes, however, there is an even more
fundamental problem with CBA’s attempt to disclaim its own normativity. By
analogizing from the metaethical construction of individual moral agency, this Part
judgments.”). Others argue that the fact-value distinction, however philosophically troubled, must remain
nominally intact in order to ensure the professional authority and deference accorded to scientists. See R.T.
Lackey, Seven Pillars of Ecosystem Management, 40 LANDSCAPE & URBAN PLANNING 21 (1998)
(“Ecosystem management should maintain ecosystems in the appropriate condition to achieve desired
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suggests that CBA’s project may ultimately be self-undermining in that it serves to erase
the kinds of conceptual distinctions that are necessary in order to preserve the sense that a
political community should engage in decisionmaking of any sort. That is, because an
essential premise of CBA is that collective choice should passively and impartially trace
the results of an individualized welfare calculus, government policies on the CBA
account are not attached to any identifiable agent who bears responsibility for their
content or effect. Ultimately, this attempt to “regulate from nowhere” may be just as
tenuous and self-defeating as the attempt to fix moral decisionmaking on a completely
impartial assessment of consequences.177
In contrast, the PP offers a simple but meaningful acknowledgment both of the
distinctiveness of political communities and their collective choices, and of the
overwhelming challenge of guiding such choices within a world of complexity,
uncertainty, and interdependency between human individuals, societies, and generations.
As will be argued, the PP’s apparent distinction between risks imposed and benefits
foregone does not represent an inexcusable ignorance of opportunity costs, as critics
claim, but rather a subtle yet significant reminder that public policymaking is at bottom
an act of collective responsibility. The choice between individualist and collectivist
conceptions, a foundational problem in political theory, is complicated in the
environmental arena by the fact that the existing policymaking paradigms struggle to
address many of the central questions raised by the sustainable development challenge,
including most significantly the need to further our moral thinking concerning those
interest holders who do not enter smoothly into conventional liberal frameworks. Thus,
the PP’s deliberate attempt to “get the social organism thinking”178 may be desirable
simply as a way of promoting the development of norms of global and intergenerational
environmental responsibility at a time when such development is sorely needed.179 At the
least, such an approach seems preferable to CBA’s implicit denial that collective agency
and responsibility even exist.
A.

Partiality

Part of the reason for the cognitive attractiveness of agent-relative theories of
individual ethics lies in their ability to prevent our lives and our identities from receding
entirely into the broader causal systems within which we are undoubtedly situated. As
Bernard Williams famously argued, attaching some special moral significance to the
affirmative expressions of an individual’s particular agency enables the “person [to be]
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identified with his actions as flowing from projects and attitudes which in some cases he
takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about.”180
Complexity theory underscores the importance of this function by positing an
expansive, yet simultaneously imperfect causal potential on the part of any single
component within complex, adaptive systems. The challenge of crafting a moral identity
within such a “complicated tissue of events”181 is especially profound: Not only does the
individual face innumerable opportunities to act, but she also experiences her actions as
deeply embedded within a causal order that belies the classical liberal belief in
predictable dyadic causal relations.182 Accordingly, under a duty of impartial
optimization, the poet’s “saddest” category—what “might have been”—would become
much more than simply a reflective indication of the challenge of crafting an identity in a
world of indefinitely many causal opportunities. Instead, it would become a reflexive
imperative to act and choose in a manner that draws no boundaries between the human
actor and the complex causal system within which she is situated. For this reason,
deontologists hold onto much-maligned conceptions such as the act-omission distinction:
Despite being endlessly manipulable183 and seemingly tolerant of unacceptable results in
particular cases,184 such distinctions ultimately are necessary in order to preserve a
coherent, stable conception of individual moral agency.
Consequentialist-utilitarians, on the other hand, regard the act-omission
distinction and other familiar manifestations of agent-relative ethics as evidence of
cognitive “bias”185 that should be “escape[d].”186 In a recent lecture, for instance, Cass
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Sunstein speculates that the deontological moral tradition—particularly as it is expressed
in such principles as the prohibition on affirmatively acting to cause a loss of human
life—arises not from a full-fledged, independent philosophical framework, but from the
use of “moral heuristics . . . or rules of thumb, that work well most of the time, but that
also systematically misfire.”187 And, indeed, Sunstein believes that the Kantian
prohibition on knowingly taking innocent human life misfires, “at least [when] the deaths
are relatively few and an unintended byproduct of generally desirable activity.”188
Instead, he argues that the normativity of action should be determined by a full and
impartial evaluation of its expected consequences on relevant interest-holders.
There is a conceptual problem, however, with the utilitarian ideal of impartial
causal optimization. As Samuel Scheffler has explained, a normative standard of
“instrumental optimality” for individuals—which attaches no special significance to the
actions, interests, or other features of the agent herself—must derive its moral attraction,
paradoxically, from “considerations other than instrumental optimality.”189 The contrary
notion that instrumental optimality has primary normative significance faces inescapable
complications. For instance, as decision theorists have demonstrated, there may be
circumstances in which the deliberate attempt to optimize may not be the most sure route
to optimization.190 Knowing when and how to depart from the optimization calculus in
favor of more pragmatically sensible approaches therefore implies the existence of some
independent agent responding to at least some additional normative criteria. Similarly,
the desirability of holding oneself to a norm of instrumental optimality cannot be
premised on a judgment that it is the instrumentally optimal thing to do—“[I]f it did, one
would need already to have accepted the norm in order to see oneself as having reason to
accept it, which means that the proposed derivation is circular.”191 To avoid such
circularity, one first must posit an independent human subject who views herself as
peculiarly responsible for the affirmative expressions of her moral agency, in the sense
that those expressions are guided by reasons that she herself has considered and chosen.
That very brand of discretion, however, seems to be what impartial utilitarianism
eliminates from our moral reasoning.
Scheffler’s argument bears some relationship to Daniel Markovits’s earlier effort
to construct an account of “the necessary architecture of the first person,” in which
Markovits argues that any meaningful conception of personal moral agency must include
186
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a recognition of oneself not only as an agent responsive to reasons for acting, but also as
a generator of reasons, including reasons that are intimately and uniquely one’s own.192
While Scheffler argues that the mere fact that individuals view themselves as subject to
moral norms of any sort implies that they must accept a distinction between their agency
and the larger causal order, Markovits argues that a minimal logical requirement of
individuals being able to coherently view themselves as moral agents is an ability to
supply reasons for acting that are not solely dictated by an external normative theory,
such as the optimization rubric underlying CBA. From either perspective, the rub is that
by urging a standard of agent-neutral utilitarianism, causal optimizers also implicitly ask
us to deny the belief that our judgments and our actions are morally distinctive—the very
belief that seems to be a minimally necessary precondition for having reason to accept
any theory of normative ethics.
Defenders of optimization might respond that the conceptual “separateness” of
moral agents is maintained in their framework by the fact that the utilitarian calculus
takes account of an individual’s own particular causal position and information set in
calculating optimal courses of action. Optimizers, however, have no way of cabining this
logic, for presumably individuals also should choose to position themselves within causal
settings and to invest in obtaining information in a manner that is calculated to achieve
optimal outcomes.193 Soon enough, this duty of causal optimality becomes infinitely selfreferential, and the individual becomes lost within a framework that achieves its goal of
consistent moral treatment only by denying the very basis on which individuals have
come to think of themselves as distinct moral agents.
Indeed, the optimization framework is not only unhinged—in the sense that it
exogenizes the process by which its intended audience develops and maintains a sense of
personal urgency concerning the framework’s subject matter—but it also is expressed in
a formal language that implicitly condemns the discretion and judgment of its subjects.
Like any other theory of normative ethics, optimization depends for its relevance and
coherence on the existence of agents who are empowered to respond to reasons for
acting, including at least some reasons for acting that are entirely independent of an
externally imposed normative framework.194 Unlike theories of normative ethics that do
not aspire to comprehensive rationality, however, the formal language of optimization by
its very nature tends to disparage any such independent reasons for acting. That is, the
formalized moral world of impartial optimization offers a series of stark choices: fairness
versus welfare, precaution versus maximization, subjectivity versus rationality. Thus,
although the optimization framework depends for its persuasiveness on the continued
self-awareness and cognitive independence of the agents it seeks to persuade, its
axiomatic structure simultaneously and unavoidably condemns those agents’ independent
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judgment as leading to sub-optimal outcomes. It is hard to imagine under such a
conception how individuals would preserve a sense of themselves as distinctive moral
actors who should abide any notions of virtue and responsibility.
B.

Collectivity

Early domestic efforts to eliminate ozone-depleting substances in the United
States were based almost exclusively on theoretical arguments as to their potential for
harm, a classic example of precautionary regulation in the face of incomplete information
regarding potentially disastrous environmental harms. Years later, empirical
investigations confirm the grounds of the scientific community’s earlier concerns, and
cost-benefit analyses now are capable of “verifying” the wisdom of that earlier
precautionary action. Significantly, however, precautionary wisdom emerged at the time
of that earlier action from a political body that saw itself as standing outside of, and being
critically disposed toward, its tools of risk assessment and welfare maximization.195
Indeed, at the time that the United States led the global effort to reduce the use of ozonedepleting substances, computer programs were rejecting satellite data on the extent of
loss in the ozone layer as being too far from the range of expected results to be valid.196
Today, the precautionary approach is derided by U.S. policy elites as a “mythical
concept . . . like a unicorn.”197 Yet if the analysis of the previous Section translates at all
smoothly from the individual to the collective context, then the precautionary approach
makes a great deal more concrete sense than PP critics appreciate: Even granting the
causal optimizer’s claim that “risks are on all sides of social situations,”198 this fact alone
should not compel the adoption of an optimization standard, such as CBA, in which risks
imposed and opportunities foregone are treated as analytically indistinguishable. Such a
homogenized conception of the causal order threatens to undermine the basis on which
moral agents have come to think of their actions as especially deserving of deliberation,
choice, and responsibility. Put differently, no coherent conception of moral agency—
even a collective one—can fully deny the distinctiveness of the agent’s choices and
actions in the manner compelled by impartial utilitarianism. Instead, something like the
“first, do no harm” admonition of precautionary adages may be desirable simply for the
implicit reminder contained within it, that the particular political community’s actions
and decisions carry distinctive moral weight.
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Of course, the desirable degree of agent-relativity for individual human actors
does not necessarily supply the desirable degree for collective actors.199 Most basically,
the classic objections to fully impartial utilitarianism—that it disrupts a life filled with
projects and meaning,200 or that it precludes special affiliations to family, friends, and
colleagues201—seem inapplicable to an institution that is charged, not with crafting an
individual identity, but with serving the collective good of society. Indeed, one might
argue that such institutions should be conceived and operated without any distinction
between the effects of their policies, and the effects that are attributable to the larger
causal system within which they operate. Institutional responsibility instead should be for
the fate of the entire system, unmediated by the “raft of baggage of personal attachments,
commitments, principles and prejudices” that comprise an individual’s narrative
history.202
Practical considerations support this line of reasoning. Unlike individuals, who
could never fulfill a duty of causal optimality with anything other than profound
incompleteness,203 human groups and institutions are thought to be able to more perfectly
realize such a duty. Institutional actors can promulgate rules and distribute costs in a
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broad-sweeping manner that individuals in their private lives could not replicate.204 Also,
as philosopher Michael Green argues, “[i]nstitutions are better than individuals at
collecting and processing information about the distant or indirect consequences of their
actions.”205 Indeed, not only can institutional actors countenance a much greater spatial
scope of concern than individuals, but they also can adopt a greater temporal scope of
concern, given their legally fictitious immortality.206 For these reasons, we may conclude
that the criticisms traditionally lodged against utilitarianism for individuals fail to apply
at the level of the nation-state and that, instead, an optimization rubric of the sort
underlying CBA is especially desirable as a philosophy for government conduct.207
The metaethical points raised in the previous Section still remain, however, for
some normative justification other than causal optimality is necessary to ground the
conclusion that social actors should conform to an optimality standard. At bottom, the
various arguments offered in favor of “Government house utilitarianism” reduce to
statements that social actors and institutions can pursue causal optimality with fewer
constraints and unintended side effects than individuals. Following Scheffler’s argument
on the individual level, however, it is not enough to say that social actors and institutions
should optimize simply because it is the socially optimal thing to do. Not only is this
statement sometimes empirically false,208 but it also is conceptually problematic in that it
is incapable of explaining the embedded assumption that social institutions should do
anything—that is, that the decisionmaking of such institutions should be the subject of
norms of any sort. The reason for that assumption is that we implicitly recognize such
institutions as “separate” moral agents, rather than simply as passive instruments of
optimization. That is, even when we try to program our institutions to be “hostage to
what the facts turn out to show in particular domains,”209 our very act of programming
concedes the moral distinctiveness of our institutional creations—and the possibility that
they might be programmed according to other visions of societal flourishing.
Deep below the push for CBA therefore seems to lurk the same conception of
collectivity that the methodology’s proponents regard as suspect within the PP. For either
approach to have compelling, persuasive, or even recognizable significance as a standard
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of social choice, it is necessary first to conceive of human institutions and societies as
distinctive agents that can respond to reasons, articulate goals, and maintain selfawareness regarding the moral urgency of social policies. A necessary predicate for that
conception, in turn, is to reject CBA’s insistence that social choice can be reduced to a
ministerial act of aggregation. Try as we might to deny it, the embrace of “Government
house utilitarianism” is much more than a practical decision involving the institutional
satisfaction of individual interests. It is a choice that reveals something intimate and
foundational about our collective moral identity—something that will be lauded,
lamented, or viewed indifferently by future generations, but that will always be seen as
uniquely ours.
As described in the next Section, unlike CBA, the PP embraces this fact of
collective self-determination, and opens up space to meet the profound responsibilities
contained within it.
C.

Moral Rationality

Contrary to prominent critiques, the PP does not require us to embrace a
fallacious belief that the larger causal fabric is benevolent210 or that human omissions are
perfectly innocuous.211 Nor does it necessitate a return to the mistaken view that we can
identify a stable “balance of nature” that exists beyond the influence of humans.212 Nor,
finally, does the PP require that that we abandon the attempt to foster specific positive
duties at the societal level (that is, institutional duties to act on the opportunity to prevent
or alleviate suffering). The PP does, however, imply the view that human agents, whether
individually or collectively, bear moral responsibility in a way that other causal forces do
not and, thus, the decisionmaking of such agents should be conducted with a sense of
moral urgency and self-awareness. Denying such a notion in favor of the fully impartial
optimization rubric invites a slippery slope of instrumentalist decisionmaking in which
moral boundaries are not only crossed routinely, but crossed without regret.
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Some authors argue that a separate or distinct notion of collective agency in this
manner “may not even be intelligible” and is, at least, of “obscure” moral relevance.213
This argument, while correct to the extent that it recognizes a larger scope of causal
potential and moral obligation for the prevention of suffering by institutional actors,
overshoots to the extent that it draws no distinction whatsoever between a political
community and the larger causal order. After all, the same challenge that exists on the
individual level—the challenge of pursuing morally desirable outcomes when the agent’s
causal potential both is filled with opportunities for acting and simultaneously is
constrained by the omnipresence and power of other causal forces—also exists on the
collective level. Even robust institutional actors such as nation-states confront a phalanx
of forces that lie beyond complete prediction and control, such as the operations of
natural systems that escape precise probabilistic understanding, the actions of foreign
nations and other non-subjects that depend on and impact shared resources,214 and the
future needs and circumstances of unborn generations that are a necessary but
unknowable feature of any policy decision involving intergenerational consequences.
At times, the challenge of defining and performing a political role within this
context becomes dramatically apparent. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for
instance, one anonymous White House official initially sought to deflect criticism of the
Bush Administration’s response by arguing, “Normal people at home understand that it’s
not the president who’s responsible for this, it’s the hurricane.”215 Four days later, with
criticism mounting, President Bush embraced the opposite normative extreme, one in
which the scope of the government’s responsibility appeared to be co-extensive with the
entire causal order: “As long as any life is in danger, we’ve got work to do.”216 As a
statement of government responsibility for hurricane prevention and disaster relief, the
latter quotation seems more desirable than the former quotation, which trades on a strong
prescriptive version of the act-omission distinction that should be rejected. What both
quotations share, however, is an acknowledgment of the state as an independently
significant moral actor, one for which even an apparent duty of causal optimality can
only be imposed as a result of reasoning, choice, and responsibility.
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The PP embraces the distinctiveness of collective decisionmaking. The political
community that adopts and implements a precautionary approach does so with a
recognition of itself as a member of a larger geopolitical and temporal community of
communities. On this account, risk regulation is not merely an opportunity to maximize
an existing set of individual welfare functions, but rather a moment to consider the
regulating body’s obligations to its present and future members, to other political
communities, and perhaps even to other species.217 Such notions of decidedly collective
responsibility are well demonstrated by the original German articulation of the PP,
Vorsorgeprinzip, which translates literally as “beforehand or prior care and worry” and
which includes notions of “caring for or looking after, fretting or worrying about and
obtaining provisions, or providing for.”218 Through these relational constructs, the PP
offers a subtle, but constant reminder that the relevant political community’s decisions
express a collective identity—an identity that the community must in an important and
unavoidable sense own.219
Rather than emerge from collective deliberation by a political community,
policies adopted under the CBA approach instead are said to “inevitably and predictably”
flow from the calculated effects of state action.220 Even assuming (unrealistically) that
adequate knowledge is available to perform this ministerial conception of policymaking,
it is unclear how CBA’s results can retain authority over time, given that the framework
implicitly denies the distinctiveness of its own audience. That is, rather than appearing
within the CBA framework as responsive—and responsible—subjects of moral
reasoning, the individuals collectively comprising CBA’s political community instead
appear as simply part of the furniture of the optimization paradigm, the underlying
normativity of which is likely to become increasingly obscure over time. The end result
of such a conception may be a form of moral anesthetizing,221 one that occurs at precisely
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the moment when sensitivity and self-awareness regarding the deep uncertainty,
complexity, and normativity of risk regulation are most in need.
The danger of moral anesthetizing seems to represent a problem not only for those
who would invest CBA with foundational normative significance, but also for those who
regard CBA simply as a decision procedure with practical worth in particular political
settings. In Adler and Posner’s view, for instance, CBA does not have “bedrock moral
status,” but instead serves only as a pragmatically useful mechanism for pursuing other
values, such as overall well-being, that do have primary moral significance.222 The
underlying conceptual problems raised by Gödel’s Incompleteness Theroem,223 however,
may haunt even those who defend CBA in this more pragmatic sense. The problem lies in
the fact that the formal language of the cost-benefit framework is not only irreducibly
incomplete; it also is capable of denying its own incompleteness.224 That is, even as
CBA’s moderate proponents depict the procedure as an aid to decisionmaking that is to
be supplemented by other considerations, CBA implicitly and unavoidably condemns
those other considerations as undesirable. Again, the tautological conclusion of the
formalized welfarist framework is that subjectivity and fairness necessarily derograte
from rationality and welfare. It is hard to see how such a framework can remain properly
limited to its actual sphere of competency, as CBA’s pragmatic defenders would have it,
given that the framework offers the seductive possibility of translating all relevant
variables into its language of optimization.
CONCLUSION
Despite the underappreciated coherence and wisdom of the PP, the problem
remains that the principle by itself does not provide adequate substantive guidance as to
how its various safety valves should be utilized. Nor does the principle tell us how to
implement those safety valves in a manner that is consistent with the simultaneous
demands of adaptive expertise and democratic legitimacy. Nor finally does the PP
directly grapple with the profound intellectual and practical challenges of squaring a
theory of intergenerational responsibility with liberal political theory.225 Development of
such important issues will have to await further work.226 For now, it is enough to note
that the task will require both humility regarding our powers of prediction and control,
and courage regarding our ability to engage in a form of public decisionmaking that
conceives of human societies and human generations as collective moral actors with their
own agency, responsibility, and history.
The risks of oppression raised by such a collective vision are well known and
justly feared. But the consequentialist-utilitarianism of CBA has a less-recognized
oppressive force of its own: By completely rejecting the distinctiveness of moral agency,
CBA leads to a radical erasure of boundaries not only between individuals, but also
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between generations—a compressing of human history into a single moment of maximal
net benefit, devoid of identities, relations, and responsibilities. As such, the optimization
rubric invites an ethical counterpart to nanotechology’s “gray goo” nightmare: a slippery
universe of homogenized interests and influences in which the very distinctiveness of
human identity and agency is slowly, but irretrievably erased. Put differently, the most
basic normative message of the PP, the Hippocratic adage, and other precautionary
maxims—the reminder above all else to be moral227—cannot be located within the
optimization paradigm. To the contrary, the optimization paradigm works to render such
a message unintelligible, for it erases the kinds of distinctions that enable us to identify
moral agents to whom the reminder might be directed.
As this Article has argued, such a conception is incapable of long sustaining the
notion that its results have compelling moral significance. Even complete acceptance of
the causal optimality approach of CBA must depend on moral reasons for acceptance that
find their source elsewhere than simply in a desire to optimize. Yet the political
communities whose moral convictions supply this source hold no clear or secure place in
the philosophy of optimization. Instead, the staunchly individualistic foundation of CBA
denies political communities the capacity to collectively articulate their goals and ideals,
a failing that seems especially problematic for policies impacting foreign nations, future
generations, and other interest holders that are not already present in the optimization
calculus. For such policies, a notion of collective agency provides the most analytically
appropriate frame of evaluation, as it permits the political community to perceive itself as
standing in relations of responsibility with and historical connection to those other
political communities. Under CBA, on the other hand, those individuals whose lives are
statistically, spatially, or temporally dispersed become subtly conscripted without their
consent into a disembodied pursuit of utility-maximization. Indeed, under the
optimization rubric, the “monetary equivalents” of their lives may be traded away for a
few weeks extension of the golf season. No amount of theorizing can make the sacrificed
“better off” in the bargain.
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